Acquisition strategies for purchasing bulk petroleum in DOD. by Wright, James Edward
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1980
Acquisition strategies for purchasing bulk petroleum
in DOD.
Wright, James Edward











ACQUISITION STRATEGIES FOR PURCHASING




The sis Advisor: D C .Boger




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PACE nVhmn Data Znttrtrf)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
I KEPOPT NUMICR 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO
4. TITLE (mnd Subtttlm)
Acquisition Strategies For Purchasing





3. RECIPIENT-S CATALOG NUMBER
»• TYPE OF REPORT 6 PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis:
December 1980
«• PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
i. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERdj
9- PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9394-0
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASKAREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
149
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME ft AOORESSfl/ SfffefWM trom Controlling OHlco)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
IS. SECURITY CLASS, (oi thlo riport)
Unclassified
1 5a. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thtt Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol (ha mbetrmtt entered In Block 30, II dlllereni from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES






Defense Fuel Supply Center
DFSC
20. ABSTRACT (Continue) on ravaraa aid* if nacaaaary end Identity by mtoc* numeer)
The Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) has, in the recent
past, been unable to obtain sufficient offers to satisfy
all of its bulk fuel requirements. Many issues have
contributed to this procurement problem. Defense contracting
is a synthesis of laws, regulations and administrative
procedures, for instance. Other contributors are socio-
economic clauses, submission of cost or pricing data, lower
DO
, SB, 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV •• IS OBSOLETE
S/N 103-0 14* 6601 I
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TNIS PAOE (When Dmtm Kntered)

UNCLASSIFIED
ggeuwrv euAMigtC£Ttew og tnh Mttmni »••• t.
profit margins on JP-4, and more.
The author examines the issues and possible alternatives
in conjunction with the structure, conduct and performance
of the petroleum industry. DFSC has already initiated
several changes to improve the contracting process. Still,
DFSC faces a seller's market with no available substitutes
for fuel. Inadequate planning and management of the Naval
Petroleum Reserve and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve have
compounded this disadvantage. Despite these limitations,




S/N 0102-014-6601 stcumvv cuamiucation o' ?*<* p*acra»«" o«w f«»»»»*i

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Acquisition Strategies For Purchasing
Bulk Petroleum In DOD
fey
James Edward Wright
Captain, United States Army
A.B., Indiana University, 1970
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






The Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) has, in the recent
past, "been unable to obtain sufficient offers to satisfy
all of its bulk fuel requirements. Many issues have
contributed to this procurement problem. Defense con-
tracting is a synthesis of laws, regulations and adminis-
trative procedures, for instance. Other contributors
are socio-economic clauses, submission of cost or pricing
data, lower profit margins on JP-4, and more.
The author examines the issues and possible alterna-
tives in conjunction with the structure, conduct and
performance of the petroleum industry. DFSC has already
initiated several changes to improve the contracting
process. Still, DFSC faces a seller's market with no
available substitutes for fuel. Inadequate planning and
management of the Naval Petroleum Reserve and the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve have compounded this disadvantage.
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(1) Production . . .
(2) Refining . .
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B. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MARKET CONDUCT
1. Conduct Under Oligopoly
2. Pricing Policy , . .
a. Crude Oil Price Controls . . . .
bo Petroleum Product Price Controls
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Assured petroleum fuels and products are a commodity
that the Department of Defense (DOD) cannot do without.
Aircrafts, ships, tanks, and trucks become useless without
adequate supplies of petroleum fuels where they are needed.
Recent events such as the OPEC I and OPEC II embargoes have
highlighted the vulnerability of these critical supplies.
The Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC), the fuel pro-
curement agency of DOD, has in the recent past, been
unable to obtain sufficient offers to satisfy all of its
requirements. Impacts of the procurement shortfalls have
been significant. An example is reductions of DOD inven-
tories of mobility fuels below required levels. Z~72:1_J7
There are many issues which affect this procurement
situation. Some result from legislation and others stem
from the way in which DFSC conducts its business. Industry
practices generate further conflicts. But these should
not prevent DOD from obtaining bulk fuels.
A. GENERAL
The major focus of this thesis is to identify the
existing problems of the bulk petroleum acquisition process.
Possible alternatives to deal with these problems are then
developed. The goal is to evaluate alternatives to arrive




In order to achieve this end, several aspects of the
process will be reviewed. This includes a discussion of
the contracting environment. Additionally, it is necessary
to determine what the petroleum industry represents as the
seller.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the regulatory and administrative environ-
ment of the hulk petroleum procurement process?
2. What is meant "by the term, "the petroleum industry?"
3. What are the present procurement procedures for
acquisition of bulk petroleum?
4. What are the relevant issues behind the procurement
problem?
5. What alternatives offer a viable solution to improve
bulk petroleum procurement?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
This research will only deal with the procurement
of bulk petroleum fuels by DOD. The distinguishing
characteristic of bulk fuel is that it is purchased by DFSC
and is funded through the Defense Stock Fund. /"~62: II-1-1_7
Primary emphasis is on the acquisition of JP-^ since it
represents the majority of DOD's requirements.
Other types of fuel procurements will not be
addressed. This includes purchases of packaged fuels.
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These are fuels which are packaged and. supplied in con-
tainers of five to 55 gallon capacity. Also included are
fuels in military collapsible containers of 500 gallon
capacity or less. £~62: I-l-22_7 Also, certain types of
"bulk fuel procurement will not be examined . They encompass
the following: £~6Z: II-l-lJ7
a. Post, Camp, and Station Bulletin contracts,
b. Bunker contracts.
c. Emergency purchases for vehicles, vessels,
or aircrafts.
d. Credit card purchases for service station
delivery.
e. Items excluded from DLA-integrated materiel
management due to limited size of procurement or other
peculiarities, as listed in appendix 2-1A of DOD 4140,25-M,
2. Limitations
The research is intended to accurately and fairly
represent the views of the petroleum industry and the
Government. Due to the limitation of funds and time, this
research is not as extensive as the author desired.
Petroleum firms and Government officials were very coopera-
tive. In order to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive
opinions and information, some aspects are addressed
in general terms. If comments are representative of most
firms interviewed, the material will "be presented as an
industry opinion. Singular statements are identified as a




In the interests of space and time, it is assumed
that the reader of this thesis has a "basic knowledge
of petroleum and procurement. However, it is presented
in a manner so that a knowledge of petroleum or procure-
ment, but not "both is sufficient to understand most of
the information.
D . METHODOLOGY
The research was conducted in three phases. An initial
literature search was conducted to gain a basic understand-
ing of the process. This was followed with a series of
interviews, "both personal and telephonic. Finally, a
more detailed literature review was pursued to develop
the issues.
1. Initial Literature Search
Numerous agencies and sources of information were
able to yield useful information on the petroleum industry
and procurement of bulk petroleum. Primary sources of
literature were the Defense Logistics Study Information
Exchange (DLSIE), the computer search program of the
Dudley Knox Library, and the Defense Fuel Supply Center.
Many secondary sources also proved useful. These included
the American Petroleum Institute (API), the American




Certain references were particularly useful in
providing information. The report of the Investigations
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on
Department of Defense Petroleum Requirements and Supplies
was the key document. Other documents concerning pro-
curement issues and historical developments were relevant
GAO reports. Current procedures and facts were well explained
in the POD Manual for the Management of Petroleum Products
,,
the Department of the Navy Energy Fact Book
,
and the
Meininger article, "Procurement of Petroleum Products for
the Navy.
"
The analysis of the petroleum industry was developed
from three principal sources. American Industry; Struc-
ture, Conduct, Performance "by Caves and class lectures
from Professor Dan Boger of the Naval Postgraduate School
on "Structure, Conduct and Performance of Defense
Industries" were especially enlightening. Further infor-
mation was gained from Vertical Integration in the Oil
Industry by Mitchell,
2, Interviews
There were two approaches used in interviews.
Telephonic interviews were used for initial contact with
oil company officials and for agency spokesmen located
away from the California area. Personal interviews were
conducted with representatives from DLA, the Defense Fuel
Region-West, Atlantic Richfield and Union 76, Other
16

agencies which participated "by telephone were the Defense
Personnel Support Agency, DFSC HQ, the Petroleum and Field
Services Directorate of Fort Lee, Virginia, Powerine Oil
and Champlin Oil Company,,
3 . Detailed Search
Periodicals gave an up to date and detailed
source of information. The ones most frequently used
were the Wall Street Journal , Business Week and the Harvard
Business Review . There were a distinct lack of theses
concerning petroleum operations and in particular, petroleum
acquisition.
E. DEFINITIONS
Barrel - Standard unit of measurement of petroleum
liquids consisting of 42 U„S, standard gallons at 60
degrees Fahrenheit. /~62: 1-1-2Q_J
Bulk Petroleum Products - Liquid petroleum products
that are normally transported by pipeline, rail tank car,
road tank truck, road tank trailer, barge, harbor, or
coastal tanker and ocean going tanker and stored in a tank
or container having a fill capacity greater than S5 U a S„
gallons
. ^62 : 1-1-20J7
Feedstock - Crude oil or fraction thereof to "be
charged to any process equipment in a refinery. Z~31:2_7
Market Price - A price established in the usual and
ordinary course of trade between the sellers who own the
item and buyers who are free to bargain. /31:2j/
17

Reference Price - It is a "base price from which the
listed item is to fluctuate. It is composed of the
monthly weighted average acquisition cost of crude oil
per barrel, /"Contract clause E19„03_7
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Procurement of bulk petroleum is a diverse and timely
topic. After a treatment of the required regulations and
manual for use in petroleum acquisition in Chapter II,
the author presents key legislative acts which influence
the process. Chapter III consists of a look at the
structure, conduct and performance of the petroleum
industry. This is followed by a discussion of special
characteristics of fuel as a commodity. Present contracting
procedures are reviewed in Chapter IV. It begins with a
historical perspective leading up to the present. Current
procedures consist of requirements submission, the con-
tracting cycle and contract administration. Procurement
shortfalls have generated much discussion on the present
methods used. That leads to the purpose of Chapter V,
to examine the issues surrounding the procurement process.
Chapter VI then pursues possible alternatives to deal
with these issues. Finally, conclusions and recommendations




II. PETROLEUM POLICY AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The procurement of bulk petroleum does not occur in a
vacuum,, To better understand the procurement of bulk
petroleum, it is necessary to examine the environment within
which it occurs. The regulations, laws and procedures
affecting this process will be explored. This list is not
meant to be all inclusive. Rather, it will treat the ones
involved in controversies concerning acquisition methods by
the Department of Defense (DOD),
This chapter presents the content and apparent intent
of this list of measures. It will serve primarily as a
reference for future chapters which will examine, in detail,
the controversies surrounding each of these measures,
A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATION (DAR)
After World War II, the Government faced the problem of
returning to peacetime operations and peacetime procurement.
To prosecute the war effectively, the rules for Government
purchasing had been temporarily liberalized. After pro-
tracted study to determine the best course of action,
Congress passed the Armed Services Procurement Act in 1947
.
The Armed Services Procurement Act accomplished workable
procurement policies for periods of national emergency.
Either the President or the Congress can put these policies
into immediate effect when either thinks the nation is
19

threatened . Second, the law recognized that negotiated
procurement is a required method of purchase in peacetime
as well as in wartime. jThx^^k
-J
The Act was implemented within DOD by the Defense
Acquisition Regulation (DAR-formerly known as the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation-ASPR) . The Regulation was
issued "by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Logistics)—now known as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) ( ASD ( MRA&L )
)
and in coordination with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force and the Director of the Defense Logistics
Agency. The purpose of the DAR is to establish uniform
policies and procedures relating to the procurement of
supplies and services under the authority of Chapter 137,
Title 10 of the United States Code or under any other
statutory authority. /~DAR: 1-101_7
The DAR applies to all purchases and contracts made by
DOD, within or outside the United States, for the procure-
ment of supplies or services which obligate appropriated
funds. One of two exceptions to the DAR is transportation
services procured by transportation requests, transporta-
tion warrants, bills of lading, and similar transportation
forms. Procurement of these excepted transportation services
is regulated by the Military Traffic Management and Terminal
Service (MTMTS), the Military Sealift Command (MSC ) , the
Military Airlift Command (MAC), and the service departments.
20

/""DAR: 1-102_J7 The other excepted item is automatic data
processing equipment (ADPE). Procurement of ADPE is con-
trolled "by the General Services Administration
.
The DAR was not intended to "be an inflexible set of
rules. It is the umbrella encompassing all DOD procurement
and leaves room for astute judgment. Innovations to attain
desirable objectives occasionally necessitate deviations from
the DAR. When this occurs, the government contracting
officers request the deviations having been determined
to be in the "best interest of the Government, /~~DAR: 1-109 »1_7
Deviations from the DAR are of two types. The first is a
deviation affecting only one contract or transaction. This
procurement may oe made or authorized in accordance with
Departmental procedures provided (i) such circumstances
justify a deviation and (ii) written notice of such deviation
is furnished through channels. /~DAR: 1-109. 2_7 The second
type of deviation is one affecting more than one contract or
contractor. This must be approved in advance by the ASD
(MRA&L). Also, unanimous approval by the members of the DAR
Committee will suffice except for matters involving major
policy. /"DAR: 1-109. 3_7 Deviations of the latter type




B. DOD MANUAL FOR MANAGEMENT OP PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
The second document which affects the procurement of
"bulk petroleum is DOD 4140 .25-M, "Procedures for the
Management of Petroleum Products." This manual is issued
under the authority of DOD Directive 4140.25, "Management
of Petroleum Products," and DOD Directive 4000.25, "Adminis-
tration of Military Standard Logistics Systems." The
manual prescribes procedures which govern the management
of "bulk petroleum products and is mandatory for use by all
DOD activities.
The ASD (MRA&L) is responsible for establishing policies
and providing guidance relating to DOD petroleum logistics
programs, systems, and procedures. The office is also
charged with assuring their effective implementation.
These functions are primarily discharged through the Director
for Energy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Energy, Environment, and Safety). The DOD energy
organizational alignment is shown in Figure 2-1.
The Director for Energy has been establshed as the
primary DOD focal point for energy matters. His respon-
sibilities include the development of Petroleum Logistics
Policy; serving as the DOD principal point of contact on
all matters of energy policy and implementation of DOD
energy policy; monitoring current energy procurement and
supply problems; reviewing DOD requests for priority
fuel supply allocations; and serving as the secretariat
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The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the Integrated
Material Manager (IMM) for petroleum products. This
includes ownership and account ability of bulk petroleum
pre-positioned war reserve materiel and peacetime operating
stocks at all levels of distribution down to the base
commander.
The Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) is a primary
level field activity of DLA and has been made the petroleum
IMM. DFSC is assigned coordinated procurement responsibility
for all petroleum products and coal with its related services.
This worldwide responsibility as IMM for wholesale bulk
petroleum products extends until their delivery to the




C. DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950
The declaration of policy describes the intent of the
Act: /"Section 2062J7
In view of the present international situation and
in order to provide for the national defense and
national security, our mobilization effort continues
to require some diversion of certain materials and
facilities from civilian use to military and related
purposes. It also requires the development of pre-
paredness programs and the expansion of productive
capacity and supply oeyond the levels needed to meet
the civilian demand, in order to reduce the time
required for full mobilization in the event of an
attack on the United States.
The crucial part of the Act with respect to this thesis is
Title I on priorities and allocation. It states the
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act (sec-
tions 2061 to 2169 of this Appendix), the President
may, by rule or order, require the allocation of, or
the priority performance under contracts or orders
(other than contracts of employment) relating to,
supplies of materials and equipment in order to maximize
domestic energy supplies if he makes the findings
required "by the next paragraph of this subsection
»
The authority granted in this subsection may not "be
used to require priority performance of contracts
or orders, or to control the distribution of any sup-
plies of materials and equipment in the marketplace,
unless the President finds that-
(A) such supplies are scarce, critical, and es-
sential to maintain or further (i) exploration, pro-
duction, refining, transportation or (ii) the conservation
of energy supplies, or (iii) for the construction and
maintenance of energy facilities; and
(B) maintenance or furtherance of exploration,
production, refining, transportation, or conservation
of energy supplies or the construction and maintenance
of energy facilities cannot reasonably "be accomplished
without exercising the authority specified in the above
paragraph of this subsection.
The essence of the Act is that it can be invoked to
require oil companies to supply petroleum products for the
Government's needs. This insures the Government can obtain
the product, but the price is still negotiable,
D. EMERGENCY PETROLEUM ALLOCATION ACT OF 1973
In January 1974, the situation for the DFSC contracting
officer was further complicated when the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act (EPAA) became effective. The EPAA required
the DOD to obtain its domestic petroleum needs by alloca-
tions placed on refiners by the Federal Energy Administration
(FEA). Now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),




Although Government policy had affected the price and
availability of crude oil for sometime, direct federal
regulation of crude oil prices was introduced "by the EPAA.
/~"71:xi_7 Under price controls and the allocation system,
competitive procurement was eliminated, and the normal
schedule for competitive "bid solicitation, evaluation and
contract award was not employed. Oil companies were told
that they would supply fuel to the DOD, generally on the
basis of December 1973 supplier-purchaser relationships.
Even though EPAA mandated negotiated procurement, competitive
bidding for oil products procured by DFSC had been eliminated
since of 1973. /~73 : 11J
E. ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT OF 1975
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) gave the
President discretionary authority to decontrol prices of
crude oil. It also modified the EPAA and essentially formed
the present regulatory system which divides all domestic
crude oil into the following three classifications, or
tiers: /~71:xi_7
- Old oil, or lower-tier oil, which is oil from
properties that began producing before 1973.
- New oil, or upper-tier oil, which is oil from
properties that began producing during or after
1973.
- Uncontrolled oil, which is oil that earns as much
as refiners are willing to pay for it. Three types
27

of oil are allowed this treatments Alaskan North
Slope oil, Naval Petroleum Reserve, and "stripper"
oil--that is, oil from wells that produce ten
or fewer barrels per day
F. TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT
Specific allegations of overpricing made against the
Air Force and Navy in the 1950 f s led, in 1962, to the
passage of Public Law 87-653, Truth in Negotiations Act.
The Act states that the contracting officer must require the
contractor to submit cost or pricing data and to certify
that they are complete, accurate, and current at the time
agreement is reached on price. These requirements apply
to all negotiated contracts, contract modifications and
price adjustments expected to exceed $100,000. This also
applies to subcontractors when their portion of the contract
is $100,000 and 10$ of the total contract or over $1 million,
Submission may be either actual or by specific identifica-
tion in writing. /~50:3B-4_7
It is helpful to define cost or pricing data at this
point. It is data consisting of all facts existing up to
the time of agreement on price, which prudent buyers and
sellers would reasonably expect to have a significant effect
on price negotiations. Being factual, these data are types
of information that can be verified. They do not reflect on
the accuracy of the contractor's judgment about estimated
future costs or projections; they do, however, reflect on
the data upon which the contractor based his judgment,
/"50:1A-B6J7 28

As is the case with most laws and regulations, there
are exemptions to P.L, 87-653. A contractor or a sub-
contractor may be exempt if the following conditions
exist: /~50:3B-4_7
- there is adequate price competition, or
- catalog or market prices exist, or
- prices set "by law or regulation, or
- the head of the procuring agency waives the requirement.
This type situation must "be documented using DD Form 633-7,
Claim for Exemption from Submission of Certified Cost or
Pricing Data.
The significance of the submission of cost or pricing
data is that the contractor is liable should there be
defective data. If it is subsequently found that the data
was inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent as of the effective
date of the certificate, then the Government is entitled to
an adjustment of the negotiated price, including profit or
fee. The Government can exclude any significant sum by
which the price was increased because of the defective data
if three things can be proved by the contracting officer.
The contracting officer must show that (a) the defective
data caused a significant variance in the price, (b) that
he relied on the data, and (c) that the false data resulted
in damage and the value of the damage . £~50:1A-B7_7 The
contracting officer can offset such overstatements by the
contractor against understatements within the same contract.
29

The remainder of an overstatement above the offset will be
recovered by the Government. If false data was submitted
by the contractor intentionally, it could result in a fine
and possible imprisonment.
G. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
For further disclosure and uniformity in procurement,
Congress, in 1970, created the Cost Accounting Standards
Board by P 3 L. 91-379. The Board has promulgated uniform
Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) for those contracting with
the Government for its defense needs. The Standards had
to be followed in negotiated contracts, with exemptions
paralleling those in the Truth in Negotiations Act.
Contractors were also required to disclose their cost account-
ing methods as a condition for contracting and had to agree
to price adjustments for failure to comply with cost standards
/"See 50 App. U.S.C. 2l68_7 In general, CAS apply to the
same contracts as does P.L. 87-653. /~50OB7_7
H . SUMMARY
The procurement of bulk petroleum by DOD is strongly
influenced by laws, regulations and administrative directives.
This environment is highlighted by several key measures. The
DAR establishes uniform policies and procedures relating
to the procurement of supplies and services within the DOD.
The two exceptions to the DAR are transportation services
30

and ADPE. There also exist deviations to the DAR. A
deviation may "be for one contract only or it can be a
multiple contract deviation,,
Another key influence is the DOD Manual for Management
of Petroleum Products, It prescribes the procedures which
govern the management of hulk petroleum products. Its use
is mandatory for all DOD activities.
Legislative acts are the major sculptor of the bulk
petroleum acquisition process. Five of these are reviewed.
First, the Defense Production Act of 1950 allows the Presi-
dent to require the oil companies to supply petroleum products
for the Government's needs. This can only be done when it is
determined to be vital for the Nation, Next is the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) of 1973 . EPAA introduced
direct federal regulation of crude oil prices and eliminated
the use of formal advertising in bulk petroleum procurement
As its name implies, it required DOD and commercial customers
to receive domestic petroleum supplies by allocation during
periods of shortage. Third, is the Energy Policy and Conser-
vation Act (EPCA) of 1975 . This gave the President discretion-
ary authority to decontrol crude oil. Furthermore, it classifies
oil as old oil, new oil, or uncontrolled oil for purposes
of price control. The Truth in Negotiations Act requires
contractors to submit cost or pricing data on contracts in
excess of $100,000, Oil companies request exemption under
the claim of market prices of commercial items sold in
quantity to the general public. Finally, Cost Accounting
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Standards (CAS) requires further disclosure and uniformity in
procurement o Contractors can "be exempted from CAS under the




III. THE STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, AND' PERFORMANCE
OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
The purpose of this chapter is to describe what is
meant by the term "the petroleum industry . " The framework
to be used for describing this industry turns on three simple
concepts—market structure, market conduct, and market per-
formance o This framework and its causal relationships will
help the reader to understand the bulk petroleum environment.
Also, the uniqueness of petroleum fuels in general and JP-4
in particular is examined. The procurement of bulk petro-
leum will be examined in a later chapter.
A. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MARKET STRUCTURE
Market structure consists of the relatively stable
features of the market environment that influence the rivalry
among the buyers and sellers operating within it. Market
structure includes many elements such as the number of buyers
and sellers, product differentiation, barriers to entry,
cost structures, and vertical integration. Thus, more than
a simple description is required to define the petroleum
industry.
Market structure interacts and is influenced by the basic
conditions of supply and demand. Market structure (the envir-
onment) in turn influences market conduct (the behavior of
economic agents within the environment), /"~1:14_7 In
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order to "begin the description of market structure, the
petroleum industry "boundaries must first "be addressed.
1. The U.S. Petroleum Industry
Unlike petroleum operations in many foreign coun-
tries, where the state owns or participates in mineral
industries, the U 3 S, petroleum industry is free of Govern-
ment ownership. It consists of corporations, large and
small business entities, and individuals.
The petroleum industry is the third largest business
in the country in terms of total assets. It is exceeded only
"by agriculture and the combined public utilities (electric,
gas, and communications). In manufacturing, however, petro-
leum ranks first by a wide margin. £"65 J 132_7
a. Four Basic Industrial Activities
At least four basic industrial activities comprise
what is broadly termed "the petroleum industry." /~65:l60_7
(1) Production . The first of these activities,
production, involves the search for, development, and
extraction of commercial reservoirs of crude oil and natural
gas. At this stage, crude oil and natural gas production
cannot be reasonably separated„ The largest crude oil
producers also tend to be the largest natural gas producers
.
(2) Refining . The refining industry acquires
crude oil from the producing industry . Through complex
distillation and catalytic processes, the crude oil is con-
verted into a wide range of useful products . From the "top
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of the barrel" comes propane, "butane, gasoline, and petro-
chemical feedstocks. The "middle distillates" are products
such as home heating oil and diesel fuel. Other refined
products are residual fuel oil and asphalt.
(3) Marketing . The marketing industry embraces
the vast network of wholesalers (jobbers), fuel oil dealers,
and retail service station operators who move finished
petroleum products to the ultimate consumer.
(4) Trans-portat ion . While a variety of
transportation modes (pipelines, water, rail, and trucks)
are available to move crude oil and petroleum products,
the extraordinary efficiency of pipelines makes them the
preferred mode for overland transportation. In 197^» not
counting gathering lines, domestic crude oil and products
movement was about 47 percent by pipeline, 29 percent by
tank truck, 22 percent by water and about two percent by rail
£~27:18_7 Trucking is more important in the distribution
of petroleum products, particularly in the relatively small
individual lots, moved from terminals and bulk plants to
retail outlets. For moving products in large quantities any
distance from the refineries, pipelines or water transporta-
tion, if available, are used.
b. Independent Companies
Each of the four subindustries contains companies
which are engaged primarily or exclusively in that activity.
There are, for example, thousands of U.S. oil and gas pro-
ducing companies, ranging from stripper well operators to
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large exploration and production companies. Similarly, each
of the other subindustries has independent, nonaffiliated
companies, /~65j160_7
c. Integrated Companies
Another group of companies are integrated, in
the sense that they are generally engaged in two or more of
t*he four basic petroleum activities. While there are smaller
integrated firms, in the context of divestiture legislation,
attention is generally focused on the integrated "majors,"
There is some disagreement on which firms might or might
not be classified as majors,
(1) Integrated Majors . Examples of these
"integrated majors" in descending order by 1978 refined
product sales are: Exxon, Texaco, Standard of California,
Standard of Indiana, Shell, Mobil, Gulf, Atlantic Richfield,
Amerada Hess, Sun, Marathon, Ashland, Phillips, and Union.
/"32: 129.7
(2) The Big Seven , Five of these U.S. petroleum
companies are also international majors. This select group
of international companies are called "The Seven Sisters."
In addition to Exxon, Texaco, Mobil, Standard of California,
and Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum must be
added.
The five U,S members of the Big Seven
have a major impact upon the domestic market. They accounted
for over 30 percent of the domestic 1978 refined product
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sales o Z/~~32;129_J7 But more importantly, a contracting
officer estimated that DFSC currently "buys approximately
50 percent of its needs through these international majors.
The reason is the size of the DFSC requirement, ~84_7
2. Elements of Market Structure
With these industry "boundaries in mind, it is now
useful to look at the elements of market structure. Broad
classifications such as oligopoly are insufficient. This
is because there can "be considerable variation in structure
within this "broad classification.
a. Oligopoly
DFSC essentially faces an oligopoly in the
refining industry. This means there are few sellers of
petroleum products and that the market activities of one
seller have an important effect on the other sellers.
Petroleum products tend to be homogeneous in the eyes of
the customer. The JP-4 from one company is equivalent to
the JP-4 of other companies, Z~~91_7 Ye-t the services
of the petroleum pipeline industry approximates a differen-
tiated oligopoly, /f~2:27^_7 ^he point being that no single
definition of the petroleum industry tells the whole story,
b. Concentration Ratios
Concentration ratios are a measurement tool
which take into account both the number and the size




Concentration ratios for the petroleum industry
are modest and do not suggest the existence of monopoly
power in the market. Since 1970, oil production concentration
at the four-firm level has fallen by 2.6 percentage points
—
from 26.3 percent in 1970 to 23.7 percent in 1978. Concen-
tration of U.S. oil reserve holdings has remained fairly
steady during the last few years, being 36 percent for the
top four in 1978 . The difference between reserve concentra-
tion and production concentration is due to the fact that
just three companies— Sohio, Exxon, and Atlantic Richfield
own most of the large Alaska Prudhoe Bay reserves. Con-
centration in refinery capacity peaked in 1970 for the top
four and is now down to 30 9 in 1978. Concentration in the
marketing of all refined products has fallen substantially
since the late 1960's—from 36.9 in the top four down to
28.6 in 1978. Finally, concentration in interstate pipeline
transportation has been fairly stable in the past few years
—
being 32.4 in 1975 and 30,6 in 1978 for the top four.
/~32:1-13_7 This general decline in concentration ratios
during the 1970's suggests that competition is increasing
in the petroleum industry.
c . Barriers to Entry
Just as concentration reflects the number of
actual market rivals of a firm, so the condition of entry
tells the story about potential rivals. Entry into
refining has been the greatest concern to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). The following is from an FTC report*
/"64:25_7 38

In addition to being a highly integrated industry, the
petroleum industry, and refining in particular, is also
characterized "by high carriers to entry. . The most
obvious carrier is the high capital cost of entering
the refining industry.
Economist David Teece of Standord has suggested that entry
into the various stages has "been relatively easy. To the
extent that it has been difficult, the problem has been the
result of Government policy or environmental restrictions.
/~9*164_7
Barriers due to economies of scale can also arise
because firms do not achieve the lowest possible operating
costs until they have grown to occupy a large portion of
the national market. In a study by Scherer /~"6:9^»336_7
it was estimated that an efficient firm in the petroleum
products industry had four to six percent of U.S. sales.
Also, an efficient firm had two or more plants. In 1978,
only the top eight firms in terms of U.S. refined product
sales met the above criteria. /~~32:129_7
d. Vertical Integration
A company is said to integrate vertically by
merging with one of its suppliers (integrated backward)
or with one of its customers (integrated forward). A
refiner can integrate vertically by merging into oil pro-
duction or petroleum marketing for example. Vertical




(1) Control of Resources . There are many
inherent advantages in controlling a firm's source of
supply. It reduces the risk and uncertainty of supply 3
Embargoes may not affect the operation, for example. By
substituting internal control for market control, the
company is no longer dependent upon market prices. Further-
more, "bargaining costs are eliminated when the supplier
is dedicated to the firm, Z"~30_7
(2) Cost Economies . A dedicated supplier
reduces the chances of a stockout. It also protects the
company against uneconomical order quantities.
(3) Profitability . Mul t id ivisional firms have
additional flexibility over competitors. This provides
options in the use of limited resources. This further
enhances profit maximization. /~"l:4l__7
(4) Alternative to Long-Term Supply Contract .
Long-term supply contracts are frequently used to combat a
noncompetitive market. Vertical integration does somewhat
the same thing. It assures a firm of a source of supply
or an outlet for its product. /~~9:132_7
(5) Functional Areas . The petroleum industry
is characterized by vertical integration through all phases
of the business. Most of the larger companies encompass
production, refining, marketing, and transportation under
the same corporate banner. This maximizes the control of a
firm in the industry and minimizes the effects of the
40

market. £~9:151_7 There is support for and much discussion
concerning divestiture of the petroleum industry to increase
competition. Conversely, there is much argument against
this.
B. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MARKET CONDUCT
Market conduct consists of a firm's policies toward its
product market and toward the moves made by its rivals in
that market . Market conduct in the petroleum industry will
be divided into three areas: pricing policies, product
quality policies, and policies toward rivals . Through a
process of action and reaction, an equilibrium is estab-
lished across the entire market. Z~ls50_7 The effect of
market conduct is to help determine how well a market
performs
.
1. Conduct Under Oligopoly
The essence of oligopoly is that there are few
enough firms that they recognize the impact of their
actions on their rivals and thus on the market as a whole.
The key to this inevitable interaction of sellers in an
oligopolistic market is that it must be recognized by the
participants.
The best performance that oligopolies can achieve
is to maximize their joint profit. This requires agreement
on the principle to do it, agreement on the details of how
to do it , and adherence to the agreement . This bargaining
does not take place around a table, but rather through
the process of offering deals in the market place and
reacting to those offered by competitors. /~1: 52-53 7
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Performance will most likely be something less
than joint profit maximization . This is because it is
very hard for oligopolists to devise a mechanism for
enforcing their agreements. The temptation to cheat becomes
an important limiting factor. Z~~1: -53_7 Also, price
collusion would violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.
2. Pricing Policy
Pricing policy is a function of product differentia-
tion. The less the product is differentiated, the more
responsive competitors are to price decreases and the less
responsive competitors are to price increases. Typically,
an oligopolistic industry is depicted as facing a kinked
demand curve in the short run. This means that if a firm
raises its price, demand for its product will fall sharply.
Thus, the demand curve facing the firm will be very elastic.
Conversely, if a firm attempts to lower its price to increase
its market share, other firms will do the same. Thus, market
shares will remain about the same and the firm faces an
inelastic demand curve. If all sellers in the petroleum
industry held this view of their rival's responses, then
the expected result would be for the industry price to be
relatively rigid. Z~"l»55_7 However, the petroleum industry
does not currently operate in an unconstrained environment.
Since August 1971, the Government has maintained
four types of controls on domestic petroleum:
- Prices of crude oil.
- Prices of products produced from crude.
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- Allocations of crude and products from sellers to
"buyers
.
- Transfer payments, or entitlements, from some refiners
to other refiners.
The "basic purpose of the controls is to reduce the infla-
tionary effects of the large increases in energy prices,





a. Crude Oil Price Controls
Wellhead prices of domestic crude oil are
established based on the initial production date of the
well, geographic area, oil quality, supply-demand relation-
ships, competitive pricing with other oil, and other related
factors. /~68:64_7 Basically, a three tier system of
price controls was instituted by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA)— see Chapter II, The President
decided to decontrol domestic crude oil prices gradually
starting on June 1, 1979. This program would allow domestic
prices to reach the world price by October 1, 1981. /~71:xiJ7
One of the hoped-for objectives of the decontrol
would be an increase in domestic production of crude oil.
This was supposed to occur due to the large revenue increases
generated by the decontrol. It does not appear that this




"b. Petroleum Product Price Controls
The prices of all refined products were
controlled until the spring of 1976. EPCA permits products
to be exempted from the controls on an individual oasis,
as the Government decides the controls are no longer
necessary. Presently, price controls exist for products
such as gasoline, propane, "butane, and jet fuel for
commercial aircraft. Price controls for other products may
oe reinstated if shortages of very large price increases for
those products occur. The price of controlled products
equals the May 1973 price of the product plus increases in
the cost of crude oil, labor costs, and other associated
costs of producing the product since that time, /~68:65_7
c. OPEC Price Controls
The traditional method of setting crude oil
prices was based upon using Saudi Arabian light crude as
the marker price. Then differential increases/decreases
could be calculated from this marker price to account for
variations in the quality of crude being sold and the ship-
ping distance. The objective was to present an equivalent
destination price to consumers. £~3:6_7
This traditional cartel system has encountered
some resistance within OPEC. Iraq's Petroleum Minister,
Tayeh Abdel-Karim, commented on this resistance, "But we
should not forget that supply and demand come into the
picture as well; their relation to differentials has not
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yet "been clearly defined." /~47: 63_7 A result of this
lack of unity is a two tier price system,, There is still
the traditional marker price of Saudi Arabian light crude.
Additionally, there is an official OPEC floor price which
has been running higher than the Arabian light crude
,
Additionally, there is an official OPEC floor price which
has been running higher than the Arabian light. Price
unity remains an OPEC goal in order to retain maximum
market leverage. OPEC influence is described further in
section D of this chapter and Chapter IV.
3 . Product Policy
Some product differentiation must be perceived by
potential customers to affect the market conduct of an
industry. As mentioned earlier, consumers do not perceive
a difference in the same type of fuel from different companies.
There is a noticeable difference in types of crude
oil. Particularly desirable types (light and sweet) of
both old and new oil sell for more than the average price.
Heavy or sulfurous crude sells for less, This is because
heavy and sulfurous types require more refining to yield
an equivalent product mix as does light and sweet. /~68:65_7
In addition to price controls, the Government
regulates the quantities of crude oil and controlled pro-
ducts in the form of supplier-purchaser relationships
—
see Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) in Chapter II.
Sellers are required to offer an amount equal to the base
4-5

period (December 1973) quantity to the same buyers that
constitute the relationship. This applies, even if the seller
does not wish to do so. During an embargo or other abnormal
supply condition— if total base period quantities are not
available—sellers are required to prorate available
crude oil and controlled products to buyers that constitute
the supplier-purchaser relationship. /~Q6:66_J
k. Policy Toward Rivals
The fourth type of Government control is entitle-
ments which is administered by the Department of Energy
(DOE). It is an equity program that attempts to equalize
the cost of crude oil for all refiners. Basically, refiners
with access to unusually large amounts of cheaper, lower
tier oil are required to pay a subsidy to refiners dependent
upon more expensive crude oil. The actual exchange of funds
occurs when refiners of lower tier crude oil buy entitle-
ments from firms with less than the average amount of
cheaper crude. The firm buying the entitlement is then
"entitled" to refine its excess (above average) lower tier
oil. The price of an entitlement is approximately the
average cost per barrel of imported oil less the average
cost per barrel of old domestic oil. /~68:66_7
This type of Government control guards against
practices such as predatory price cutting. This is
especially beneficial to smaller refiners without large
suppliers of old oil.
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One method apparently being used as a hedge against
rivals is to diversify the firm into other products
.
Statistics on ownership of proven coal reserves and uranium
concentrate reserves are replete with the names of oil
companies. /~32:l62,182_7
C. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY MARKET PERFORMANCE
Market performance is defined as an appraisal of how
far the economic results of an industry's behavior fall
short of the best possible contribution it could make to
achieve these goals. In other words actual performance
is compared to potential performance. /"~1:66_7 This is
not an easy thing to measure. Furthermore, market conduct
and performance in the petroleum industry have been in-
extricably intertwined with government policy to the point
where it is impossible to understand one without reference
to the other. /~5sl^3_7
Of the many measures of performance, perhaps profit
is the best known. After nearly two years of spectacular
earnings jumps, the major oil companies profits for the
third quarter— July through September—were a modest six
percent. This is compared to the preceding increases of
30 percent to 90 percent. /~l6:89_7 Bu 'fc analysts say
even that small increase reflects a "major accomplishment"
during an oil glut and during a recession that has slowed
oil demand and hurt the earnings of diversified companies.
/ ^3_7 Major companies such as Texaco and Exxon attribute
the third quarter earnings gains to higher prices for
domestic crude oil and gas production. /~38_7
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Petroleum pricing shows another facet of performance
for the fully integrated firm, the cost of producing its
crude oil is the real input cost of its refining operations.
To the nonintegrated refiner, however, it is the price of
crude oil that determines the refiner's input costs. The
result is that any increase in crude prices will raise the
costs of a nonintegrated refiner by a much greater amount
than the costs of a refiner that produces any substantial
amount of its own crude. /"~5:152_7
Gasoline shortages and subsequent unprecedented price
increases convinced most consumers that "gasoline is
gasoline," to be bought on the basis of price rather than
brand. This alone increased competition. Faced with declin-
ing domestic crude supplies and uncertain foreign oil,
major oil companies responded with a drive toward greater
efficiency in downstream refining and marketing operations.
They closed unprofitable outlets and realigned their market-
ing territories. Now, even the large majors tend to exhibit
regional strength rather than national dominance. /~~5 : 143 -153_7
There are other measures of performance such as industry
progress. An example of this is the development of synthetic
fuels. Capacity is also an indicator. This is discussed
in Chapter V.
D. OPEC INFLUENCE ON THE MARKET
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)
was formed in i960 in an attempt to restore the world
surplus of oil and reduce higher price levels. OPEC
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mem"ber nations are Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. /"~19:189_7 The Arab
oil embargo of 1973 was outward proof that OPEC had over-
come its earlier difficulties in organizing and was a
market factor to be reckoned with in the future.
OPEC had a profound impact upon supply. It curtailed
production which eliminated surpluses. Secondly, it issued
nonnegotiable price increases. This was in conjunction with
increasing world demand. jT"19:189_7
Political ramifications of OPEC actions have not gone
unnoticed. U.S. support of Israel has been challenged by
OPEC. Second, the sale of Naval Petroleum Reserve (NPR)
crude oil has caused some problems. The record high price
of $41 per barrel of NPR crude caused a ripple effect through
the market— see Chapter V.
The Iranian oil cutoff of 1979 reduced the U.S. supply
of crude. Perhaps a more significant result was that
situations developed which the oil companies could have used
to further tighten supplies and to increase prices and profits.
£"74: l6_y Examples of this are included in Chapter III.
Because the U.S. is a large importer, it must be
sensitive to these pressures. In 1977 » imports comprised
4-9 percent of consumption. Of the imports, 84 percent were
from OPEC countries. /~~68:25_7 The oil companies who can,




E. REFINED FUELS-A DIFFERENCE
It is reasonable to ask what makes petroleum different
from any other commodity. First, it is one of the few
commodities that is absolutely essential to both military
operations and the industrial activities that support the
Armed Forces, In fact, in the area of mobility fuels
there are no substitutes. Z~72:9_7 Second, the sources
are worldwide and the U.S. imports approximately 50 percent
of its consumption. Hence, the political and economic
climates of various unrelated geographical locations have
profound effects on market and the availability of the
product. Third, the enormous rate of military consumption
makes it impossible to store but a fraction of the U.S.
wartime, or even peacetime, requirements. DOD is the
largest single U.S. energy consumer and accounts for about
two percent of the national energy consumption through
direct usage. The consumption level for DOD and related
industries amounts to five percent of overall national
energy use. Z~"68:1_J7 The impact of petroleum consumption
during hostilities is even greater,, During World War II
and the Korean War, fuel comprised over 60 percent of the
total tonnage transported to the theater of operations.
/T^9'-l_7 Fourth, transportation costs are relatively more
important than for most centrally traded commodities.
Refining involves very little lost weight and it generally
costs more per barrel to transport products than crude.
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Therefore, most of the world's refining industry is located
near consuming centers. /~3:2-3_7 Fifth, petroleum fuels
are hazardous and must be handled with care.
For these reasons, energy— and in particular petroleum
—
has "been given such high visibility from the top levels
of Government and Defense. Examples witnin DOD— see
Appendix I— include the Defense Energy Policy Council,
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Energy, Environment, & Safety),
and the Defense Fuel Supply Center. Outside DOD, of
course, is the Department of Energy,
The elasticity of demand should be considered when the
market conduct of fuel suppliers is analyzed. Elasticity
of demand is the degree of responsiveness by consumers to
a price change in their product. In the case of fossil fuels,
elasticity of demand is apparently very low— approximately
0.1. /~4l:76_7 This means that the percentage change in
quantity demanded is much less than the percentage change
in price.
The elasticity of demand for fuels would rise signifi-
cantly as: (1) the number of good substitutes available
increase; (2) the larger the item is with respect to one's
total budget; and (3) the more the product is regarded as
a luxury item. A study done in 1977 stated that fossil
fuels failed all three of these criteria, //~~41:77_7
In short, inventory levels are significant. For example,
the size, location, and composition of inventories allow
flexibility in when a consumer buys. This flexibility
is insignificant in the long run. ^3:10>_7
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F. JP-4, A PROBLEM UNTO ITSELF
JP-4 is a naptha base jet fuel which is used primarily
by the Air Force. A 1975 staff study /~73:19_7 noted that
over 50 percent of the total dollar volume of the DFSC
purchases were for JP-4. A review of Fiscal Year 1980
contract solicitations "by the author indicated this com-
ment still appeared to be valid. But dollar volume is only
part of the problem.
A shortage of light, sweet crude oil and increased
demand for light products, such as commercial jet fuels and
motor gasoline for the civilian market, resulted in reduced
JP-4 production by refineries. General Seamon, Commander
of DFSC, identified several reasons why refiners have been
reluctant to produce JP-4. £~12\$J
Among them were: A lack of refining capacity to pro-
duce light, refined products, especially unleaded motor
gasoline which comes from the same naptha feedstock as
JP-4; a desire to maintain higher profit margins
which are available from making motor gasoline rather
than JP-4; and, dissatisfaction with the requirements
of the Defense Acquisition Regulations
.
Each of those reasons were confirmed in subsequent testi-
mony by representatives of petroleum suppliers and refiners,
/~72 :5_7 Thus, the problem is that JP-4 production means





The paradigm of structure, conduct, and performance has
been used to explain the functioning of the petroleum
industry. Market structure interacts and is influenced by
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supply and demand . Market structure (the environment) in
turn influences market conduct ("behavior of the economic
agents within the environment ) . Finally, market conduct
sets the level of how well a market performs.
The U.S. petroleum industry is big business . The
industry consists of four subindustries: production,
refining, marketing, and transportation. Within each of
these subindustries are many independent firms , The
remainder of the firms, and better known, are the inte-
grated companies.
Characteristics of the petroleum industry structure are
many and varied. It is essentially an oligopoly consisting
of few sellers and many buyers. Concentration ratios are
modest and show a trend of increasing competition. There
are arguments that barriers to entry may be high or low.
Vertical integration is one of the key features of this
industry. This means that firms in a subindustry have
merged with their source of supply or their customer. This
enables control of resources, cost economies, higher profit,
an alternative to long-term contracts, and reduces the
effects of the market upon the company.
Market conduct consists of pricing policy, product
policy, and policy toward rivals. The potential against
which an oligopoly is measured is the maximization of joint
profit. However, conduct is highly regulated.
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Price regulation is governed under the EPCA on crude
oil and products. OPEC price selling acts as a price
control. Crude oil price controls are presently being
phased out.
Product policy is governed under the EPAA which
established supplier-purchaser relationships using a base
period (December 1973). Refined products are homogeneous,
but commercial buyers and DOD contracting officers see
considerable differentiation in crude oils.
Policy toward rivals is controlled under an entitle-
ments program. It attempts to equalize the cost of crude
for all refiners.
The most significant indicator of market performance
has been profits. The petroleum industry is enjoying
record profits due to decontrol of crude prices . The
objective is to spur oil exploration and product ion . The
OPEC market leverage has had an impact on the domestic
industry.
Refined fuels are different from other products and
commodities. Reasons include: (1) fuels are essential
to military operations; (2) sources are worldwide
j
(3) the large rate of military consumption; (4) transpor-
tation costs are significant; and (5) fuels are hazardous
cargo. This has resulted in high level management. Addition-
ally, the elasticity of demand for fossil fuels is low.
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JP-4 requires special emphasis „ It consumes over half
of the DOD fuel dollars and is primarily an Air Force
fuel. Also, refiners are reluctant to produce it. It is
produced from the same feedstock as unleaded gasoline and
therefore, competes with unleaded gasoline for refinery
feedstock. JP-4 also brings refiners lower profit margins
than commercial alternatives from the naptha feedstock.
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IV. PRESENT PETROLEUM CONTRACTING PROCEDURES
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the current
acquisition methods for procuring bulk fuels. This is
necessary to understand the issues presented in the next
chapter., Historical events leading up to the present are
examined first. This is followed by the current method.
It covers requirements submission, the contracting cycle,
and the contracting procedures.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
1. Prior to 1973
Until 1973, the DOD was able to obtain all the
petroleum products necessary for support of the Armed
Force's operations. During these days of a chronic- glut
of oil, DFSC was able to buy fuels from the surplus products
of oil refineries. Additionally, it was not uncommon for
DFSC to receive offers for 150 percent or more of the products
it required. With such an abundance of offers, DFSC was
able to acquire all the products it required at prices
which were generally lower than the commercial market.
Furthermore, DFSC was able to use short-term contracts in
its procurements. This permitted DFSC to take advantage




The procurement method used during these days of
plentiful supply was formal advertising. This is the
preferred method of contracting by statute .
—
51:1A10_7
It is assumed that this method generates the greatest
degree of competition among potential bidders
,
2. 1973 Oil Embargo - OPEC I
The 1973 embargo dried up the foreign market and
alerted DOD to the vulnerability of its petroleum supplies.
It also demonstrated the inadequacy of the Defense Produc-
tion Act as a means of obtaining fuels for the Armed Forces.
Although invocation of the act occurred in August 1973,
it was three months before any products were delivered. It
was seven months from the invocation before deliveries were
were completed. The situation eased with the end of the
embargo. Sufficient products were again available, but at
much higher prices. /"~72:4_7
A major result stemming from the embargo experience
was that DOD imposed a stringent fuel conservation program
on the Armed Forces, That program has been very effective.
Consumption of petroleum products has decreased from 727 » 000
barrels per day (BPD) in 1973 to 466,000 BPD in 1979.
There are suggestions, however, that the readiness of the
Armed Forces may have suffered because of the sharp reduc-
tions in training flights and exercises which were necessi-





A simultaneous development was a switch in procure-
ment method to negotiation
. This occurred because suppliers
were under price and allocation controls following the
passage of EPAA— see Chapter II. Negotiation was mandated
by the EPAA. /~73
: H_7
3 . Cost or Pricing Data
DFSC requested in May and again in June 197^ a
blanket waiver of the rquirement for contractors to submit
cost or pricing data to support their prices of crude oil.
This would also dispense with the DD Form 633-7, Claim for
Exemption from Submission of Certified Cost or Pricing Data.
Arguments for and against this topic are discussed in
Chapter V. Both of these requests were denied by DSA (now DLA)
Headquarters. The reason was criticism of using trade publi-
cations as the sole basis for supporting an exemption.
Z~73:15_7
In September 197^-, DFSC notified contractors that in
future contracts they would be required to supply DFSC with
cost or pricing data for all negotiated contracts of
$100,000 or more. They must also include the cost accounting
standards clauses unless they qualified for the exemptions
—
see Truth- in-Negotiat ions in Chapter II. /~~73:26_7
The oil companies responded to this hard line stand
by claiming the exemption, but refusing to supply cost or
pricing data. This noncooperation caused DLA to request
the help of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) On
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November 24, 1974, Mr, Mendola, the ASD, wrote to the
Chairman of the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB)
seeking blanket waivers of the requirement for oil
companies to comply with CAS. Reasons given were that the
end of the fiscal year was rapidly approaching and insuf-
ficient offers had been obtained. DOD could waive
the cost or pricing data, but only the CASB could waive
its requirements. CASB denied the request which meant






The DFSC had reached an impasse with the major oil
companies in contracting for its petroleum supplies with the
following year just days away, The oil companies refused
to supply data to back up their prices and would not enter
into contracts containing these clauses and clauses
requiring conformance to certain cost accounting standards
,
The military felt that it could not legally accept petroleum
supplies without a contract even if offered by the oil
companies. The impasse generated a staff study by the
Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations of the Committee
On Government Operations, United States Senate. //~73:III_7
The Subcommittee took an active role in trying
to break up the impasse and appealed to the oil companies
and urged them to meet their national responsibilities
and enter into these critical contracts, A subsequent
agreement by the oil companies resulted in cooperation and
the submission of additional data to DFSC. DFSC said this
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would establish market prices against which Defense pur-
chases could be measured. Because this meant that cost or
pricing backup need not be submitted by the oil companies,
the General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to examine
if such exemptions were warranted. /"~73:HI_7
GAO conducted the requested audit in 1975. They
concluded that the exemptions from submitting certified
cost or pricing data were proper to the extent that the
products acquired were the same as, or similar to, pro-
ducts sold commercially in substantial quantities. But the
market price information obtained, from either the con-
tractors or elsewhere, was not complete, DFSC could
not insure that prices paid were equivalent to prices paid
by comparable customers on recent transactions. The
center determined that all 68 noncompetitive suppliers
during 1975 should be exempted from requirements for
supplying supporting cost or pricing data and from complying
with cost accounting standards. £~75'-&J
Sales data obtained from the contractors was
verified by comparing it with information contained in
Government and industrial publications such as Piatt's
Oilgram and Oil Buyer's Guide, Piatt's Oilgram was the
publication most frequently relied upon and is a daily
publication providing detailed information on prices quoted
and actual sales. Because Piatt's did not audit or verify
the information it received, there was no way to insure
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the information was current, accurate, or a representative
sample of independent sales transactions. /""73:8__7
4. 1974- Jet Fuel Contracts
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations also
pursued the procurement of jet fuel since it made up more
than half of the total dollar volume during this time
period (1974-1975). Before the embargo, the DFSC was
buying jet fuel for two cents a gallon less than the domestic
airlines. After the embargo, it paid an average of from
four to eight cents more per gallon. DFSC proferred two
explanations for this change. First, some of the airlines
had long term contracts,. The lower prices in those contracts
carried through the embargo and beyond . DFSC did not have
the protection of such contracts since they were spot
buyers. Second, DFSC said it was unable to estimate its
jet fuel requirements for a period longer than six months.
^73:8_7
The Subcommittee saw the problem differently. The
answer seemed to lie in the regulations of the FEA (now
DOE). Under these regulations, the oil companies were
permitted to "pass through" higher costs for crude oil and
other charges. Some products such as jet fuel had no limita-
tions on pass through costs. Accordingly, the oil com-
panies might have allocated a large share of such costs
to aviation fuel. Furthermore, they might have allocated
an even higher portion of such costs to the military, as
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opposed to commercial airlines. The Subcommittee concluded
that these procurement practices may have cost the Govern-
ment millions of dollars
.
/~73:24_7
5. Iranian Oil Cutoff - OPEC II
In late December 1978, after several weeks of
sporadic interruptions, oil exports by Iran were stopped.
They were not resumed until March 1979. Since that time,
Iran had produced an average of between three and four
million barrels per day (MBPD) until the Iran- Iraq war.
Prior to the cutoff, Iran had produced between five and
six MBPD. /"7^:i_7
Although the above GAO report found no evidence that
the major U.S. oil companies had created the OPEC-II
oil shortage in the U.S., several situations developed as
a result of, or concurrent with, the reduction of Iranian
petroleum exports which further tightened U.S. crude oil
supplies. Reflect on the multinational oil companies*
crude oil allocation procedures. Companies decreased each
affiliates* crude supplies by the same percentage, regard-
less of the affiliates original planned source of crude
oil. For example, if the company determined that their
second quarter 1979 crude oil supplies would be 16 percent
short of requirements, they applied this same 16 percent
reduction to each affiliate's oil supplies. Another situa-
tion which developed was an unusual reduction in U.S.
crude oil production. Finally, decisions of the larger
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companies not to purchase crude oil on the spot market helped
tighten U.S. crude oil supplies. This could have been a
result of the record high levels of oil prices on the spot
market. /~74:ii_7 Prices jumped from $25 a "barrel up to
$40 a barrel or more . £~m>:Qj
Crude oil price increases by producer governments
as well as those quoted in the spot market were further
indications of a shortfall in supplies. In economic terms,
supply will always equal demand at some price . If avail-
able supplies are less than what is demanded, prices will
go up until buyers are driven out of the market and supply
and demand are again in balance. £~l^''lj
Iran's reduction in crude exports and the ensuing
disruption of the world petroleum markets had a severe
impact upon DFSC's petroleum procurements. The surplus
market, upon which DFSC depended, disappeared. Brigadier
General Seamon, Commander of DFSC, testified on October
10, 1979: Z"72:4_7
Over the past several months, due to increasing fuel
prices and limited availability of crude oil, we have
not been successful in procuring our total fuel re-
quirements. In most instances full coverage of require-
ments has not been obtained even after resolicitation.
In addition, we have experienced particular difficulty
in negotiating reasonable prices in overseas markets.
The tight supply situation was reflected in both
domestic and foreign markets in which DFSC procured its
products. By early 1979, DFSC found that some of its
suppliers were not delivering products in accordance with
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the contracts. Others were either reducing the quantities
they were offering for sale to the military or declining
to offer any product at alio Z~"72: ^_7
The effect of these procurement deficiencies was
soon reflected in declining inventories of DOD petroleum
products. Faced with declining fuel inventories, DOD had
to decide between curtailing its training even further to
conserve fuel or use fuel from its war reserve stocks for
training. It chose the latter. This was a calculated risk
and viewed as a short-term solution. Z~72:4_7
6. Iran- Iraq, War
The latest development in the environment of bulk
fuel procurement is the Iran- Iraq war. Prior to this con-
flict which began in September 1980, the market was soft,
i.e., supplies of crude oil were fairly abundant. This was
primarily due to the increased production on the part of
Saudi Arabia. C^J Oil companies are now beginning
to have trouble contracting for new supplies despite the
world oil surplus. The reason is the continuing war between
Iran and Iraq which eliminated three to four MBPD from world
markets. As a result, spot prices for petroleum are
continuing to rise. Some crudes are once again approaching
$40 a barrel on the spot, or noncontract market. Z"~48_7
Some major U.S. oil companies also reported having
trouble arranging to buy crude oil on term arrangements.
The big oil companies aren't buying much on the spot market.




B. THE PRESENT PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE
The present system is described in three parts . The
requirements submission, the procurement cycle, and the
contracting procedures are presented , These evolved as a
result of the contracting environment just explained and
political objectives of the Executive and Legislative
branches of Government.
1. Requirements Submission
Each service is responsible to determine its
estimated bulk fuel requirements for peacetime consumption
and for war reserve stocks by area and location. /~20:22_J7
Peacetime computation of requirements is normally based
upon demand experience for the preceding twelve months
with adjustment for known changes. The Prepositioned War
Reserve Materiel Requirements are computed using war plans,
force structure, equipment density, consumption factors,
and days of supply to be prepositioned. Each service
consolidates its estimated fuel requirements for a given
period and submits the information to its respective
Service Control Point (SCP). These SCP's are the U.S.
Army General Materiel and Petroleum Activity, the Navy
Petroleum Office, or the Directorate of Energy Management
in the Air Force.
The SCP's review the requirements and consolidate
them under the various DFSC purchase programs. They are
organized by product and geographical area, some of which
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reflect specific delivery requirements and ultimately
contract line items numbering in the hundreds . The
review is made against historical supply patterns and past
contract lift rates. The requirements are examined for
possible alternative modes of supply where options exist, and
for potential impact of any anticipated changes in storage
and distribution systems or operational patterns.
The compiled service requirement is then translated
into a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR)
by the SCP and forwarded to DFSC. The MIPR specifies as
a minimum, how much of what products are to be delivered
where, when, and by what mode These requirements are
submitted in accordance with the schedule in DFSC Regulation
4220.1.
Upon receipt of the SCP MIPR, the DFSC Supply
Operations Directorate reviews the requirement in relation
to similar requirements received from other customers.
They are compared to the overall supply situation with
particular reference to planned changes in area inventory
levels and distribution patterns. The review may result
in a recommended change to the distribution pattern, or a
decision to supply the product through a means other than
procurement such as redistribution of stocks from another
area, or recommended procurement action . If procurement
action is indicated, the SCP requirements are consolidated
with those of the other services and non-DOD customers to
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arrive at the total quantity by type to be purchased. A
purchase request (PR) is then prepared by the Supply
Operations Directorate and submitted to the Directorate
of Procurement and Production. £~20:22-23_7
2. The Contracting Cycle
Upon receipt of the PR, DFSC is able to develop
an acquisition strategy and begin the acquisition cycle.
Negotiation is the required method of contracting under
existing legislation— see EPAA in Chapter II.
The contracting cycle normally spans 160 to 175
days, excluding the goal of contract award 30 days before
the initial delivery date. /~20:23__7 Following receipt of
the PR from Supply Operations, about 15 days is required to
prepare, print, and mail a Request For Proposal (RFP).
The RFP includes the terms and conditions of the prospective
contract such as quantities, locations, and delivery
schedules. The RFP is mailed to all prospective contractors.
That includes former bidders and anyone else who requests to
be added to the mailing list. Potential contractors must
then be allowed 30 days to review the solicitation and
prepare their responses. This time is used by the potential
contractors to examine unique delivery requirements at
each location and whether the mode of delivery is acceptable
to them. Also, volumes and delivery schedules must be
matched against refinery schedules and existing inventories.
All offers exceeding $100,000 must be accompanied by cost
and pricing data or market data to support the reasonableness
of the offered price.
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All offers go to the DFSC Market Research and Analysis
Office initially. Approximately three to four weeks are
required to review and qualify the supporting data for
acceptance of bids. The Directorate of Procurement and
Production is allowed about 35 days to negotiate with
all prospective contractors. Even offers which are as high
as three dollars per gallon are queried. Z~"80_7 All offers
are then forwarded to the Office of Data Systems for computer
analysis of factors such as transportation. The objective
is to evaluate the bid variations and arrive at the least
total cost to the Government among the potential contract
awards. Data analysis takes approximately ten days. If
small business set-asides, labor surplus concern areas, or
other special considerations are involved, another ten to
15 days are required to incorporate these factors into the
final determination of the optimum award pattern. These
factors cannot be done on the computer.
It should be noted that when contracting large
programs, such as jet juel for the coming year in the East
Coast region, it is normally necessary to contract with
multiple suppliers. This is because no one firm has the
capacity to supply the total DOD requirement. After the
final mimimum cost solution is computed, approximately ten
days are required to prepare the proposed contracts. These
go to the DFSC legal office for contract' review. This
requires another 15 days.
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If the contract is valued in excess of $35 million,
then it must "be submitted to DLA HQ for a review prior
to award which requires another 15 days. Thus, the total
review time for these contracts becomes 30 days. When all
functions are completed on schedule, contract awards are
made 25 to 30 days prior to the contract effective date.
The contracting cycle is depicted in Figure 4~1.
This does not actually end the contracting cycle.
Contract administration and distribution of the product
are still the concern of DFSC. It is not enough to make
an optimal contract award. The customer must receive
the right quantity, at the right place, at the right time,
of the right quality, at a fair price. Then the cycle has
been satisfactorily completed.
3 . Price Analysis
Exemptions from the submission of cost/pricing
data are usually granted to contractors in the petroleum
industry under the exemption for market price. To support
the claim of market price, contracting officers develop
a market price range for each procuring area and product
line. The purpose of establishing market ranges is to
give the contracting officers a competitive market price
for a given type of product in a given area. DFSC has
divided the United States into four procuring regions:
East, West, Gulf Coast, and Inland . Data for the latest








































































the contracting officer to construct a market range of
prices where substantial sales of petroleum products were
made to the general public. The high range is established
by averaging all the industry high prices for the previous
period by geographic area. A low range is in the same
manner. Thus, the market price range is actually the
differential between the high average and the low average
by geographic area for the latest 30 days. Z~75 sl0_7
After the market price ranges are constructed, the
contracting officers perform price analysis on a contract-
by-contract basis. A direct comparison of the offered price
is made with the market price range. This function is done
by the Center's Cost and Price Analysis Branch. /~"75 : 10_7
The proposal is considered for negotiation, even if it is
above the competitive range. Offers below the range are
accepted as a bargain.
Price analysis requires more than just comparing a
quoted price with the market price range. For example,
annual requirements for aviation fuel may be as much as
five billion gallons. Once procured, this aviation fuel
must be distributed to as many as 300 military installations
The basic objective is to procure the required fuel at the
lowest laid-down (fuel plus transportation) cost to the





Price analysis may not sound too complicated until
one considers all the bidding options that are available
to the oil companies . Consider that there are five modes
of transportation which are available for fuel shipment.
The Government has numerous transshipment points which are
available for routing and storage purposes . Second, many
of the larger oil companies possess several shipping points,
each of which may have limited shipping facilities as well
as limited supplies of fuel. Third, the potential con-
tractors may bid either "Destination," which represents
a laid-down price to a specific installation, or "Origin,"
which requires that the Government pay the shipping cost
(as well as determine the destination and routing) for
transporting the fuel. Fourth, there may be price breaks on
separate quantities. A company may "tie in" its bid to one
or more separate companies. That is, it makes its maximum
offer contingent upon the amount awarded to other (specified)
bidders which are its customers. Finally, a company may
indicate a minimum or maximum acceptable quantity for one
or more shipping points. /~29i9-10_7
5. Linear Programming
The magnitude of variables to consider in evaluating
bids may seem awesome, but it is handled quite routinely
by linear programming. The objective of a linear program
is to allocate the fuel resources to meet the stated needs
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in the optimum manner . However, there may be still more
features to consider in bid evaluation. Factors such as
discounts, time options, escalations based upon increased
crude oil prices, and small business set-asides must be
dealt with exterior to the optimization model, /~~29s9-10_7
As one might suspect, no computer processed algorithm
conclusively solves the problems of procuring fuel. Many
subjective considerations must still be dealt with exterior
to the optimization model. The judgment of experienced
experts remains as the most important element in the system.
Linear programming does, however, provide DFSC managers with
a sophisticated, highly efficient tool for dealing with the
quantitative aspects of the problem a Furthermore, it allows
them to allocate their time and effort more effectively
elsewhere. /"29:3^_7
6. Set-Asides
The RFP may be either an unrestricted procurement
or a set-aside. A set-aside is either total or, as in most
cases, a partial reservation by percentage. The set-aside
may be earmarked for small business only, or labor surplus
area concerns only, or a combined small business/labor
surplus area concern.
Set-asides stem from the Small Business Act and
represent the desire of Congress that small business
should receive a fair share of the Government's procurement
dollar. /~"4:565\J A firm bidding on a contract for bulk
fuel is classified as small by the DAR if: /~DAR,l-701 lJ7
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(i)(i) its number of employees does not exceed 1,500
persons; (ii) it does not have more than 50,000 barrels
per day crude oil or bona fide feed stock capacity from
owned or leased facilities; and (iii) the product to be
delivered in the performance of the contract will contain
at least 90 percent components refined by the bidder from
either crude oil or bona fide feedstocks,
7. Negotiated Procurement
A typical scenario is described based upon the case
file of a DFSC negotiated procurement, /T^J This
scenario provides the negotiation sequence and key decision
points in fuel contracting.
The contracting officer receives a proposal for JP-4.
The proposal is accompanied by a request for exemption from
the cost and pricing data and CAS. Sales data is provided to
justify a market price. The present trend in the industry
is that all companies are requesting the exemption from the
cost or pricing data. A DFSC spokesperson indicated that
DFSC has not rejected any requests if the offer was in the
competitive range or qualified for catalog exemption.
The ultimate objective of the Government, in this
case DFSC, is to obtain the JP-4 at a fair and reasonable
price. This implies delivery of the JP-4 according to the
schedule published in the RFP. The negotiation process
consists of many steps and involves much planning to enable
DFSC to reach its objectives.
Requirements are in a dynamic state. To keep
possible offerors informed of pertinent data, amendments
are provided to companies. The offerors must comply with
all provisions of the RFP and its supporting documents as
of the time of their submission.
7^

The JP-4 price data is evaluated using the acquisi-
tion cost of crude oil for a base. A differential between
the market area average cost of crude and the market area
average product price is calculated. An alternative differ-
ential is between the contractor's average cost of crude
and his average product price. This provides DFSC a picture
of the offeror's markup. From this data and analysis, the
contracting officer forms the Government negotiation objectives
They are the Government's going- in objective, the low, and the
high. The contractor sets similar objectives. The contrac-
tor's high price is considered to be his initial offer.
Sound management practice requires the contracting
officer to keep his superiors informed. During a pre-
negotiation briefing, the contracting officer informs the
approving authority about his objectives, how they were
developed, and obtains comments on these. This briefing
and the subsequent Memorandum For Record (MFR) represent a
Pre-Negotiation Business Clearance „ The extreme points
which form the objective positions are determined logically.
For JP-4 a composite market price is used. It is composed
of a weighted average of 70 percent gasoline and 30 percent
kerosene. This is because JP-4 is not sold commercially
At the low objective, the low of the composite fuel range
(equivalent to JP-4) will be used unless the contractor
has a lower price for JP-4. This is advantageous to the
Government since gasoline and kerosene are sold in
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substantial quantities to the general public. It is also
necessary to support the claim of substantial quantities
sold to the general publico If the contractor's price for
JP-4 should happen to be lower than the composite, then the
lower of the two prices will be used a The same rationale
is used to determine the high objective. It is established
at: (a) price no higher than the high of the market range or
(b) the contractor's offer, whichever is lower.
Negotiating tactics and principles are revealed in
the above mentioned MFR. It is the policy of DLA that all
negotiations will be opened at prices below the low objective,
provided that the artificial low can be supported. This is
done in order to keep the Government's negotiations on an
equitable footing with the respective contractors. In
order to remain abreast of the pricing data, DFSC updates the
market for JP-4 on a daily basis as the negotiation approaches.
This enables DFSC to update the negotiation objectives to the
same point in time as the latest market range should the
contractor revise his offer with more recent prices.
The Memorandum of Pre-Negotiation Briefing may confirm
that the contractor would not be required to submit cost or
pricing data. The exemption is justified with DAR 3-807.3 (f)
which relates to the market price exemption. Non-price
objectives would be recorded here. An example would be to
encourage the contractor to sell more JP-4 than he offered.
The Price Negotiation Memorandum records the results
of the negotiation. A successful negotiation requires that
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a mutual price "be agreed upon "by the buyer and seller . It
is common practice for negotiations to begin with the seller
at the high extreme and the "buyer at the low extreme . The
negotiation process should bring the two parties toward a
mutual agreement. In order to reach this mutual position,
the high objective for DFSC (buyer) must overlap the low
objective for the seller. If this does not occur, then one
or possibly both of the parties must modify their respective
positions until a price is agreed upon. This is the basis
of the contract price and how it was determined, DFSC has
the option to award the contract, based upon the initial offer,
without discussion of the proposal., Since it would be diffi-
cult to demonstrate that adequate competition is present and
that the initial proposal would result in a fair and reason-
able price, this is seldom done. For example, even a few
pennies saved would result in a significant savings with a
contract for 50 million gallons.
One final comment on negotiation. The Defense Con-
tract Audit Agency (DCAA) has ruled that cost and pricing
data cannot be applied to petroleum. Z~86_7 This will be
dealt with in the next chapter.
8. Contract Types
Contract awards may be of two types. The most common
is the Fixed Price with Economic price adjustment (FPE), also
called Fixed Price with Escalation, C&&J This is used
when sellers are reluctant to quote a Firm Fixed Price (FFP)
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"because of the risks associated with inflation. Therefore,
the Government and the contractor agree on a marker crude
price. As the marker price escalates, so does the price
of the fuel being sold. The economic price adjustment can also
occur downward, out this is unlikely with fuel prices.
The other type contract award which can occur is an
FFP contract. This is used sometimes for spot market buys
or purchases with a short delivery time Another circum-
stance is when a new contractor has not had time to accumulate
crude oil costs. /""86_7
9 . Product Distribution
Transportation of petroleum products is a major
item of expense in procuring fuel. Because of the cost
of transportation, contractors and DFSC give much consider-
ation to the scheduling, routing and coordination of petro-
leum movements.
In general, companies control the general level of
product distribution costs by picking strategic locations
for their refineries and primary terminals . By locating
near population centers and, wherever possible, on navigable
water, they can avail themselves of high volume movements
with resultant low unit costs.
Product distribution follows quite orderly, defined
lines, but the combination of modes for moving the products
may be somewhat complex. All practical combinations of
terminals, distribution plants and transportation media are
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employed in moving products from the refiner to the DFSC
customers. Bids are predicated upon the selection of the
least cost combination of these factors. The optimum goal
is to move the product as directly as possible with as large
a quantity as possible. /~*57:181_7
a. Product Pipelines
Product pipelines in the U.S. generally flow
from refining areas, mostly along the Gulf Coast in Texas
and Louisiana, to major consumer areas along the East Coast
and in the Midwest. Products lines are largest at refining
areas and get progressively smaller as products are dropped
off at terminals or metropolitan areas along the route.
Small stub lines serve individual refineries. /~~12:ll6_7
The extraordinary efficiency of pipelines makes
them the preferred mode for overland transportation of fuel.
In 197^ » product pipelines trasported about 30 percent of
the total traffic in refined products . /~57:128_7 Pipelines
are the cheapest, most dependable, and energy efficient mode
of transportation. The reason they are not in greater usage
is because of their point to point service. A user must be
near a pipeline to benefit from its advantages.
b. Tank Barges
Tank barges are designed to transport bulk petro-
leum for comparatively short distances in harbors, coastal
or inland waters. Use by DFSC and contractors requires access
to these same waterways. The cost of operation varies from




c 3 Tank Trucks and Tank £ars
Tank trucks and railroad tank cars are used for
transporting bulk petroleum products between points not
served by pipeline or water transportation facilities. Tank
trucks have an advantage over tank cars in that they can
deliver directly to the ultimate consuming equipment. Both
offer speed of delivery, but at a higher cost than the other
modes. /~57:128_7
d. Product Flow
Orders are placed against the contracts by a
variety of offices, generally determined by the mode of
delivery. /~20:23_7 When delivery is by direct pipeline
connection to a bulk storage facility, the orders are usually
placed by the receiving activity. If delivery is by tanker,
orders are placed by the DFSC Tanker Distribution Division.
It coordinates activities with the Military Sealift Command's
Tanker Operations Division. When delivery is by barge, tank
truck, rail tank car, or through commercial pipeline operating
companies, orders are placed by the Defense Fuel Regional
Offices in coordination with the Military Traffic Management
Command (MTMC),
Typically, distribution is via pipeline when
possible. The product will then be stored in a Defense Fuel
Support Point (DFSP) for subsequent delivery by other modes.
A DFSP is a terminal and may be Government owned Government
operated (GOGO), or Government owned contractor operated
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(GOCO), or contractor owned Government operated (COGO),
or contractor owned contractor operated (COCO),
DFSC also has the responsibility to maintain
product quality up to receipt "by the user. Sometimes this is
done by Quality Assurance Representatives (QAR) at the
refinery. Othertimes, the Defense Contract Administration
Services (DGAS) verifies the quality at the DFSP or
receiving terminal for example. Z"~8l_7
One interesting distribution technique used by
oil companies is product exchanges. These exchange agree-
ments can have a significant impact upon a company's trans-
portation costs. For example, an integrated refiner, X,
may have plenty of JP-4 at location A, whereas its refinery is
some distance away at location B. If it can locate another
refiner, Y, who needs JP-4 at A and has a surplus at B, X
will agree to swap JP-4 to Y at location A and receive an
equal volume from Y at location B. Crude oil exchanges, in
contrast to product exchanges, are normally simultaneous
purchases and sales.
There are real economic benefits from exchanges,
as the industry points out. Wasteful cross hauling is
eliminated, and transportation charges are maintained. Many
economists, however, are concerned about exchange agreements.
For one thing, they foster close working relationships among
competitors in production and supply. For another, it would
seem that the economic benefits of exchanges could be achieved




DFSC has traditionally "been a buyer of surplus products
from refineries. Thus, when crude is plentiful, fuel is
relatively easy to buy. But when times are hard, such as
OPEC I and OPEC II, DFSC is in an awkward posit ion , Refiners
cater to their regular customers. This has been partially
offset by the EPAA and the EPCA. Additionally, fuel conser-
vation measures have been taken by the DOD.
Cost and pricing data has had and still has an uncertain
role in fuel procurement. With the advent of negotiated
procurement, it became a requirement. DFSC contracting
officers exempted the oil companies from compliance on the
basis of market price. DFSC has been criticized for this
policy by GAO and DLA among others. The latest development
is that the DCAA ruled that cost and pricing data did not
apply to petroleum. Attempts by DFSC to obtain blanket
waivers were unsuccessful.
The present procurement procedure can be described in
three parts. The initial phase is the annual requirements
submission by each Service. These are based upon past
consumption and known changes. Fluctuations in war reserve
stocks are also included. Requirements which cannot be
met by redistribution of stocks are combined into a purchase
request (PR) by the DFSC Supply Operations Directorate and
forwarded to the Directorate of Procurement and Production,
The contracting cycle comes next and normally requires
160 to 175 days. During this time, the PR is transformed
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into a Request For Proposal (RFP), The RFP is sent to
prospective contractors informing them of the necessary fuel
quantities, locations, and delivery schedules. Potential
contractors respond with offers. The offers are then
evaluated at DFSC HQ for accuracy of supporting data in the
offer and data analysis of bids to determine the optimum
cost alternatives. Negotiation is used to arrive at a fair
and reasonable price for the product with the contractor.
Potential contracts are reviewed by DFSC legal and when in
excess of $35 million, by DLA HQ.
Existing contracting procedures are a synthesis of
legislative and administrative constraints . Price analysis
is used to construct a competitive range and evaluate a
contractor's offer. Bid variations can be diverse and
complex. But the speed and efficiency of linear programs
(LP) enable a contracting officer to accurately compare the
relative costs. Set-asides complicate the job of the contact-
ing officer since they must be dealt with external to the LP.
Negotiated procurement is a series of interactions with superiors
and potential contractors to arrive at a fair and reasonable
price. Contract award is then possible.
Contract awards are usually FPE contracts. FFP are
occasionally used for spot market buys and when new
contractors have not established cost data.
Distribution of the products is a complex process. Fuel
seldom is transported in strict compliance with the contract.
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Yet the customer gets what he needs when and where he wants
it. Quality is maintained via inspections at the refinery and
other critical locations.
With the current procedures in mind, it is now possible
to discuss the problems with the procurement of bulk
petroleum. The problems are varied and numerous.
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V. BULK PETROLEUM PROCUREMENT ISSUES
Shortfalls in the procurement of "bulk petroleum by
DFSC as recently as 1979 have caused concern among legisla-
tors. The Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee £~72_J investigated this problem. It
wanted to determine the impact of OPEC II and the procure-
ment shortfall upon DOD and the defense capabilities of the
U.S. Armed Forces. While inventories of all military fuels
were depleted during 1979 » the most seriously affected were
jet aircraft fuels, particularly JP-4.
General Seamon, Commander of DFSC, noted that one of the
lessons DFSC learned from its recent acquisition problems is
"the need to reassess our methods of acquiring petroleum
products." Z~~72:5_7 That need was recognized by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Claytor as well. Clayter testified
that he had initiated a review of petroleum contracting
procedures in an effort to encourage suppliers to respond
to DFSC fuel solicitations. The following issues have been
identified as contributors to the reluctance by oil companies
to contract with DFSC: /~72 :6_J
Much testimony was received concerning fuel contract
provisions, which suppliers considered onerous and
which tended to discourage them from dealing with the
Government. General Seamon identified wage and price
guidelines, allocation clauses and deceleration clauses
in Government fuel contracts as examples of provisions
which were regarded as burdensome by suppliers. Witnesses
representing suppliers and refiners identified other
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problems they encountered in supplying the Government
,
They cited the time required by the Government to accept
an offer to supply products, i.e., generally a month as
opposed to a few days or a week with most commercial
buyers. They stated they believed that contracting
documents were too long and required extended periods
for analysis. It also was pointed out that negotia-
tions with the Government sometimes consumed several
months
.
Suppliers also complained of the length of time required
to obtain payment on a Government contract. Some sup-
pliers complained of the option which DFSC reserves to
take only as much fuel as it needs; e.g., so long as
the Government takes $100 worth of the contract quantity,
it is regarded as having complied with the contract and
is not required to accept delivery on the balance of the
contract quantity, regardless of whether that might be
for fuel worth several million dollars. Witnesses also
testified that they believed many of the standard pro-
visions of the Government's fuel procurement contract
were not essential and tended to discourage suppliers
from responding to military fuel solicitations. As
an example, it was pointed out that a Government jet
juel invitation for bid contained over 100 pages, while
a similar invitation of an airline contained an average
of 7 to 10 pages.
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the major
issues as perceived by the petroleum industry and the DOD.
The issues will not be rank ordered by degree of importance.
The objective is to outline each issue, why it is considered
a problem, and present perspectives on the issue. Only then
can alternatives be considered to deal with the issues.
A. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATION (DAR)
The DAR establishes uniform policies and procedures
relating to the procurement of supplies and services for
the DOD. This is under the authority of Chapter 137 > Title
10 of the United States Code. /~DAR$1-101_7 There has been
much dissatisfaction expressed concerning the requirements
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of the DAR. Some companies feel this is the key problem
with fuel contracting. Oil companies perceive the DAR
as being a set of general rules which are applied to all
procurement situations, Z~79_7 It's purpose is compared
to that of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The purpose
of the Code is "to achieve uniformity in the laws of the
several States relating to business transactions so that
trade and commerce will not be hampered by a plethora of
differing and sometimes conflicting rules." £~7 %YLlJ
This parallels the intent of the DAR. The implication
appears to be that a broad set of rules is not totally ap-
plicable to a specialized industry
,
In spite of the broad application of the DAR, one industry
spokesman commented that it appeared to work well for
hardware procurement. Hardware procurement was defined as
aircraft, tanks, and construction contracts.
There was general concensus that the DAR was prescribed
by law. The criticism is directed at the lack of recognition
for accepted industry customs. It is interesting to note
that one of the stated underlying purposes and policies
of the Uniform Commercial Code is "to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties." /~UCC,1-102__7 There is also
general agreement among the oil company representatives inter-
viewed that there is little chance of significant change to
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the DAR with respect to petroleum procurement. The DAR
reflects legislative goals now and will continue to "be
constrained for the same reason.
All the contractors acknowledge the need for the Govern-
ment to protect the taxpayers' money. After all, the Govern-
ment contract agencies are not immune from fraud and
inefficiency. Yet the question remains, "How much Government
control is necessary?" /~79_7 This complaint has not gone
unnoticed. It was noted in the report of the Investigations
Subcommittee that progress has been made: Z~72:6_7
The contract review task force established by Deputy
Secretary Claytor has made significant progress in
streamlining petroleum contracting procedures. At
the subcommittee's final hearing on February 25 (1980),
the Department's (DOD) witness reported that, after
reviewing the entire contract form, the task force had
eliminated approximately two-thirds of the clauses
from contracts used in the foreign market, and about
one-half of the clauses from its domestic contracts.
The author questioned contractors about their perceptions
of these initiatives. Most consider the changes mentioned
in the above report /~72 :6__7 to be a step in the right
direction, but their impact is superficial. Specific clauses
and proposals mentioned as alternatives will be addressed
later in this chapter.
B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLAUSES
At least one company perceives the key problem in
contracting with DFSC to be the imposition of socio-economic
goals upon the Government contracting process. It was
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suggested that every special interest group with any clout
could corner key congressmen to promote a bill that would
further their cause through the contracting process. Rather
than make a fight, it was commented that oil companies prefer
to weather the storm on lesser issues. This is due to what
the oil companies see as bad publicity over increased
profits
.
A variety of socio-economic programs are imposed by
legislative and administrative edict on defense procurement.
The Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) recognized
39 socio-economic programs as having impact upon Government
procurement, //~?6:77_7 There have been more added since
the report was published in 1972, According to Peter Dineen,
/~~36:8_7 a "socio-economic program is defined as any
executive, legislative or departmental program or policy that
is basically designed to promote, advance or achieve social
benefits through economic means," Although Douglas Hutchens
states /~51j10-22_7 "with few exceptions the guidelines for
implementing the socio-economic requirements specify that the
programs will not add to the total price of the contract,"
However, he goes on to state that the conclusion of the COGP
is that these programs do add significant additional costs.
Furthermore, the COGP concluded, "The cumulative effects
of these programs already imposed on the procurement process
and the addition of those contemplated could overburden
it to the point of threatening breakdown," /~69*Vol I:lll__7
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A DFSC contracting officer stated that the cost to the
oil companies was in terms of extra time to comply, extra
personnel to supervise the administration, and of course
money to comply with requirements. /~Q6_7 ^ is no secret
that these additional costs for compliance are passed on to
the customer, DFSC.
The oil companies say their current solution is to
cooperate fully with DFSC and work within the system.
Their true goal is to streamline the contracting process to
more closely resemble commercial practices. They fully
recognize that the two processes cannot be identical.
Government contracting officers are not enamored with
implementation of the socio-economic programs. The area
seems to have conflicting rules, more restrictive actions,
and assumes an all-knowing attitude on the part of the
procurement managers.
The conclusion of Hampton and Lorrette /~18_7 is that
these programs are politically enticing and will continue
to target the federal procurement programs for implementation.
Consequently, this thesis does not suggest there is a better
way to implement socio-economic goals, but accepts this as
a current reality.
C. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
There is a widespread impression that Government purchasing
is totally different from commercial purchasing. This
impression is not altogether valid. Both Government and
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industrial purchasing are concerned with buying the right
quality, in the right quantity, at the right price and time,
and from the right source. However, Government purchasing
frequently involves special considerations which are not
usually applicable to the purchaser in private industry,
/~4i5^1_7 This section explores the key differences affect-
ing petroleum procurement in industry versus Government.
1. Items Purchased
DFSC and commercial customers are buying the same
products, with one notable exception. JP-4 is produced
primarily for the military. The military equivalent of
commercial jet fuel is JP-5 which is used by the Navy. This
one exception is not insignificant since it represents over
one-half of the DOD total fuel requirement. It was mentioned
in Chapter III that JP-4 is a direct competitor with unleaded
gasoline. Therefore, when demand for unleaded gasoline is
high, it becomes more difficult to buy JP-4. Refiners
have a larger market for unleaded gasoline than JP-4.
Additionally, unleaded gasoline is sold to the industry's
regular customers whereas JP-4 is sold to DOD as a spot
market customer. Z~~91_7
The challenge for DFSC is to maximize its market
strengths as a large customer and minimize the product
differentiation it faces. With product differentiation
such as JP-4, the seller's bargaining position is strengthened.
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2. Source of Funds
Another major difference "between commercial and
Government purchasing is the source of funds used for the
purchases. At all levels of Government, taxes paid by
citizens and businesses are used to purchase the required
fuels. The appropriation and authorization process and the
DAR allow the Government contracting officer considerably
less freedom of action and discretion than business allows
its industrial counterpart. While these procedures are
designed to protect the interest of the taxpayers, they
generally result in less flexibility and in many cases,
greater total cost than would occur if the Government used
profit-oriented business purchasing techniques,, /"4:5^2_7
Budget flexibility can save money, Spot market
buys or purchases of larger quantities can sometimes result
in a cheaper price for fuel. However, DFSC can only make use of
this when normal procurement action does not meet requirements.
Of course to use this flexibility requires adequate storage




Authority of Contracting Officers
Under the Constitution, the Federal Government is a
government of delegated powers only. Its contracting
officers lack the full powers and the broad management
authority of a corporate executive. The contracting officer
must have "express" authority, delegated via a written warrant,
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in order to obligate the Government and enter into a contract.
In commercial contracts, the "buyer is acting under "apparent"
authority. The UCC states that under the law of agency, a
seller acting in good faith may reasonably assume the
commercial "buyer has authority comparable with that of
similar agents in similar companies. The seller may hold
the buyer's company liable for their agent's actions.
/"70l6_7 Conversely, the Government is not liable if its
agent act without express authority.
The reputation of the DFSC contracting officers
was mentioned by all oil companies = Without exception,
the comments were that the contracting officers were extremely
knowledgeable, professional, and helpful in dealings with the
contractors.
4. Contract Documents
There is a significant disparity between the commer-
cial and Government contract length and complexity. A
typical DFSC contract is in excess of 100 pages whereas the
commercial equivalent ranges from one to ten pages. A
representative comment from industry concerning the length
of a Government contract is, "It takes 15 minutes just to
find what volume of fuel the contract requires." /"~82_7
One spokesman attributed the difference in size to the
inclusion (or absence) of the socio-economic clauses. The
commercial customer is not concerned with these legislative
requirements, but in obtaining the fuel at a fair price
from a reliable contractor.
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In addition to the length, the contract complexity
must be considered simultaneously. A general perception
is that contracts are filled with legal language and
are difficult to understand. Interpretations of clauses are
often a culpit. Typically, a contractor interprets to his
advantage, DFSC may disagree, and then discussions result in
an attempt to reach a mutual understanding
.
Each contract solicitation and contract award must
be reviewed with a fine tooth comb. Clauses may change
or may be included by reference. This requires oil companies
to maintain an accurate and current copy of these clauses on
file.
Potentially the most devastating consideration to
the contractor is the Christian Doctrine. The Christian
Doctrine is based on the landmark case of G.L. Christian
and Associates vs. United States (312F 2d 418, ct. cl; 320F
2d 3^5 (1963) ). The Doctrine says that if the DAR requires
a clause and it is inadvertently left out, the contractor
is still bound by the clause. This interpretation was
because the DAR is statutorily based. Many clauses are
mandated by legislation and it is a well established prin-
ciple that, "Ignorance is no excuse under the law a " Thus,
it behooves the oil companies to be as familiar with the
DAR as the DFSC contracting officers
.
5. Contract Relationship
The Federal Government plays a dual role in contract-
ing. In one role, the Government is a sovereign, and as such
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can determine the conditions for doing business in the
Government market. For example, it can regulate the actions
of its prime contractors. As a buyer, the Government is
unique in its ability to pass laws that influence pur-
chasing transactions. For instance, P.L. 87-653 gives
Government buyers the right to examine suppliers cost or
price data under cettain conditions. £~k>i5k>9j Further-
more, the Government deals with its contractors at arms
length. The Government does not guarantee a contractor
against loss or bankruptcy.
Oil companies have considered DFSC to be a spot
market buyer. This was consistent with the DFSC position
of buying from the industry excess. This relationship
denied DFSC certain services which commercial buyers enjoy.
Now, DFSC receives much of its fuel through allocations.
Regular customers of the petroleum industry receive
additional consideration. Industry spokesmen commented
that the regular customers get first priority on deliveries.
Sometimes sales of fuel and shipment occur on the basis of
a phone call and without a contract. But there is more to
a relationship than the exchange of fuel for money. Commer-
cial customers often receive management expertise from the
firm as a service to the customer. Company reliability
and assistance are factors in causing a customer to return
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again. Because the Government contracting officer must
normally contract with the lowest bidder, contractors feel
less obligation to provide these same services to the
Government. Advice and management time provided to the
Government may result in a situation where another competi-
tor benefits.
6. Sources of Supply
The degree of freedom that exists in selecting
sources of supply offers another excellent example in
contrast between commercial and Government buying. Since
both parties use negotiated procurement, in theory they both
select the suppliers who offer the best deal. However, the
Government contracting officer must frequently divide a por-
tion of the total requirement into a set-aside. The set-
aside can be for small business or a labor surplus area
concern or both. This requires solicitation of companies
fitting this category, but they may not be the low cost
supplier. £~k:56b_J The commercial buyer is free to choose
suppliers on the basis of total value. DFSC contracting
officers solicit using a bidder's list, plus anyone who re-
quests to be considered.
7. Procurement Administrative Lead Time
It requires considerably more time to plan a solicita-
tion and negotiate with potential contractors in Government
procurement. Commercial deals can be consummated in a few
hours or days. DFSC needs weeks to accomplish the same
function. This is due to policy constraints on the con-
tracting officers. Z"~79_7 05

8. Reserved Contractual Rights of the Government
The Government reserves some important rights
governing the actions of contract partieSo Certain
clauses are not subject to waiver by the contracting officer
or negotiation. Examples include the Changes Clause, the
Disputes Clause, and the Termination for Convenience Clause.
/~23:250__7 These clauses and others slant the contract in
favor of the Government.
The Changes Clause provides the Government the
unilateral right to direct changes in the contractor's
actions. The Disputes Clause allows the contracting
officer to make a final determination in disputes between
DFSC and the contractor. Finally, Termination for Convenience
can be unilaterally directed. This is not without cost
since the contractor is entitled to an equitable adjustment
for completed work, preparation for termination, plus a
reasonable allowance for profit. But one can see, these
actions are hardly standard fare in the private sector.
The basic intent of contracting officers in the
Government and buyers in the private sector is similar.
The differences stem from the legislative and administrative
constraints upon DFSC. For a more thorough treatment of
this subject, the reader can refer to Lee and Dobler,
pages 5^1 through 577.
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D. COST OR PRICING DATA
Contractors are required to submit cost and pricing
data under certain conditions—see Truth in Negotiations,
Chapter II. This is equivalent to opening the company books
for inspection as a condition of doing business. This is
considered a major issue by the oil companies.,
All oil companies who request exemption from the require-
ment to justify their catalog or market price are being
approved. Z~80_7 Consequently, the concern is that less
than a blanket exemption may lead to enforcement some day.
E. COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The same exemption as cost or pricing data applies to
Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). The exemption is for
established catalog or market prices of commercial items
sold in substantial quantities to the general public—see
Chapter II.
The Report of the Investigations Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee identifies CAS as a major
obstacle in fuel contracting. /~72:6__7 The reason is that
CAS enforcement would require double accounting due to
industry custom. A representative comment is that companies
are not going to rework accounting systems when the DFSC is
not their major customer.
Petroleum is a joint product which means it would be
difficult to determine how to allocate costs. Currently,
there is no single cost accounting method of allocating
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costs to different products that are produced by the same
process, commonly called joint products . An example of the
problem is how to allocate the cost of a barrel of crude
oil to the various products of a refinery. /~55 : 85_7
CAS and cost or pricing data are intertwined: /~55j86_7
If there are no competitive quotations or suitable
market prices, contracts for fuel supplies must be
negotiated on the basis of cost and pricing data. In
these circumstances it may become necessary to base
contract prices on costs. In the absence of a Stan-
dard on allocation of joint product costs, it would
be difficult if not impossible to reach agreement on
joint product costs allocable to a particular contract.
The Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) attempted to
deal with this cost allocation issue . Originally, five
separate Standards on indirect costs were proposed in March
1978. The five proposals were reduced to three in July
1979. On promulgation, those three proposals were consoli-
dated into a single Standard on allocation of direct and
indirect costs. /~54:3483_7
Cost Accounting Standard 418, Allocation of Direct and
Indirect Costs was the result of the CASB work It became
effective on September 20, 1980 The Standard does not
seem to address the sticky issues of cost allocation of
petroleum products except in a very general manner. For
instance, an issue paper asked for views of interested
parties on methods of allocating joint costs, the definition
of by-products, and accounting for by-products. /~66:10-752_7
Standard 418 which resulted does not mention these issues a
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The CASB is no longer in operation. However, the Cost
Accounting Standards in existence are being maintained. This
leaves the petroleum industry in the same predicament as
before. Firms continue to request the exemption and hope
CAS is not enforced.
Both cost and pricing data and CAS are enforceable from
a Government perspective. This is because the contract
contains the Audit by DOD Clause, /~DAR 7-103.7 Therefore,
the contracting officer designated representatives, such as
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), have audit and
inspection rights. There can be examination of cost or
pricing data and reports submitted by the contractor.
Worthiness of cost or pricing data and CAS hinges on
time and money. It is the author's opinion that the use
of market data is a viable alternative.
F. PAYMENT PROCEDURES
Industry officials commented on an apparent breakdown
in administration after the contracting officer is notified
of a price increase. Oil companies must formally notify
the contracting officer of a price increase. The contract-
ing officer must in turn notify every administration center
who makes payment of the price increases. This requires time.
The problem is at the point of payment. If the author-
izing official has not received the price increase, two
things can happen. First, the official may refuse to make
any payment until the apparent price discrepancy is resolved.
This is the worst result for the contractor,. It decreases
his cash flow.

The second is that sometimes payment is made on the
delivered quantity at the old price. This is equivalent
to a partial payment. The difference is paid following
notification of the price increase. However, long delays
sometimes result since payment centers are not equipped to
deal with partial payments on a complete shipment.
Oil ompanies took steps to combat this delay.. Payments
are now due upon receipt of the invoice. For example,
one company noted that commercial customers pay within a
couple of days.
The delay in payment is one cost which cannot be passed
onto the Government. For one company to attempt this would
probably cause its bid to exceed the ceiling price of the
compet it ive range
.
The contract review task force established by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Glaytor instituted a "fast pay"
procedure.
j
/~72:6_7 This allows suppliers to be paid upon
presentation of an invoice.
It appears that the notification of price increases to
payment offices will continue to generate payment problems.
Price changes come frequently due to domestic crude oil
deregulation and OPEC manipulations. Speed of notification
to payment offices is the key to improve this issue. Decen-




Delay in payment is not unique to commercial contractors.
DFSC also has a cash flow problem. The Armed Services are
not "billed until after the monthly stock report is submitted
by the Defense Fuel Supply Regions to DFSC Headquarters. This
procedure creates a 60 to 90 day delay in reimbursement to
DFSC by the Services. Z~8l_7
DFSC is installing a computerized inventory system to
correct its cash flow problem. The Defense Fuel Automated
Management (DFAM) system will notify DFSC HQ electronically
of shipments to Service customers. This will enable rapid
billing. /"8l_7
G. PROFIT MARGINS
Oil companies typically price refined products using the
"balanced barrel" concept. The balanced barrel concept is
based upon the fact that a barrel of crude oil always yields
various types of refined products. The variation in percen-
tage of the total barrel can only be maximized to a finite
degree. For example, the average annual yield of gasoline
from a barrel of crude oil is ^5.5 percent compared to 6.8
percent for jet fuel. Z~26_7
While production of a refined product in high demand
can be maximized, a market must still be found for the
rest of the refined products from the barrel of crude oil.
Therefore, the supplier must sell low demand refined products
near cost or even at a loss to deplete inventories. An
example is petroleum coke.
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Conversely, high demand products are sold at a profit
sufficient to offset the low profit margins or losses from
the low demand products. £~?>5_7 Historically, gasolines
and refined petroleum products for aviation have been ideal
targets for profit maximization. This is because, unlike
distillates and residual fuels, there are no alternatives/
substitutes and demand is quite inelastic, /~47:192_7
Higher profit margins are available from making motor
gasoline than can be obtained from JP-4. Z~72:5_7 This is
due to two reasons. First, there is greater demand for
gasoline than JP-4. Second, JP-4 has only a military appli-
cation and is considered to be a low quality jet fuel. There-
fore, it is sold for less than higher quality jet fuels
such as JP-5 and Jet A-l. Z~8l_7
In periods of tight crude supply, oil companies have
little profit incentive to produce JP-4. JP-4 production
reduces the capacity of unleaded gasoline since they come
from the same feedstock. Furthermore, industry does not
consider DFSC a regular customer. The Government contracting
milieu is a further disincentive. Plus, a company's first
obligation is to its stockholders. However, support of the
Government is more than a matter of economics. Z~85_7
Crude oil decontrol enables higher profit margins. It
was mentioned in Chapter III that profits are up to record
levels early in 1980. Recent financial statements for the




When markets are soft—supply exceeds demand— the
Government has little problem obtaining JP-4. Oil companies
want the DFSC business and are willing to accept a lower
profit margin than can be obtained from unleaded gasoline.
H. PRICE ESCALATION
Spurred by inflation and OPEC price increases, most of
DFSC's contracts include an escalator provision. This is
sometimes referred to as "indexation." Sellers usually
prefer not to quote a firm fixed price because of the risks
associated with the possibility of inflation. If forced
to make such a quotation, particularly in periods of
increasing inflation and costs, sellers will include in their
price, contingencies for increases in the cost of labor and
materials. These contingencies may not materialize. Hence,
to avoid paying for something not received, the buyer uses
an escalation clause . /~4:117_7 Escalation in petroleum
contracts is limited to fluctuations in crude costs or other
bonafide feedstocks.
An escalation clause provides for either upward or
downward changes in price due to shifts in crude costs. DFSC
previously used a deceleration clause. This limited the
amount of upward adjustment that could occur without renego-
tiating the contract. This has been eliminated. In a Fixed
Price with Escalation contract for other goods and services,
upward escalation is usually limited to ten percent, Z~4:117_7
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Comparatively, the cost of Arabian light crude rose from
$18 a barrel to &30 a barrel from September 1979 to
September 1980, This is a 6? percent increase. C^^J
Finding a meaningful index to which escalation may be
tied is a real problem. Escalation is automatic once the
contract and index are agreed upon. Therefore, the con-
tracting officer's team and the oil company marketeers should
negotiate this aspect carefully.
All economic price adjustments (escalation) in DFSC
petroleum contracts are based upon changes in a negotiable
reference price. This is established in the escalation clause
of the contract. A base reference price consists of a four
month weighted average acquisition cost of crude. Escala-
tion is then based upon the difference between the base
reference price and the reference price as reported month to
month by the contractor to the contracting officer. In an
attempt to be fair and reasonable to all petroleum suppliers,
the DFSC uses several reference prices in their contract
awards. /~31:1_J7 Examples are company postings, postings
in Piatt's Oilgram, and the cost of crude. /*~84__7
The DFSC was criticized by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) in 1975 for this procedure: /~75:12_7
Price adjustment clauses based on an individual com-
pany posting of a refined product do not represent an
industrywide contingency but merely a price at which
one company is offering to sell its product. The danger
in using this arrangement is the possibility of a con-
tractor increasing its posted price even though there
may not have been a general market change. A Center
official said the Center tried but was unsuccessful in
getting the clauses in the 2k contracts tied to the
acquisition cost of crude oil.
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The use of acquisition cost of crude oil also has its
pitfalls. There are some companies that have their
own sources of crude oil. Thus, the transfer prices
for these crude oils are not necessarily the same
as those which would "be arrived at through independent
sales transactions.
The Center felt this criticism was due to a misunderstanding.
As a DFSC contracting officer pointed out, this information
is audited. DCAA audits each contractor a minimum of once
every three years.
Pitfalls in this system still remain. Bradshaw and
Herrick /~31_7 examined five possible postings in their
thesis. They looked at (1) Saudi Arabian crude oil, (2)
Kuwait crude oil, (3) Nigerian crude oil, (4) Caltex JP-4,
calculated from naptha and kerosene postings, and (5) Shell
Eastern JP-4, calculated from naptha and kerosene postings.
They concluded that no one price adequately met the require-
ments for a "single best" reference price. They went on to
say: /~31:109-110_7
Hence, if the DFSC is to be "fair and reasonable" to
all contractors, the combination should ideally be
all crude oil postings or all refined product postings.
Since the purpose of a fixed price contract with esca-
lation is to provide protection against changes ( "signi-
ficant economic fluctuations") in the contractor's
cost schedule that lie beyond his control, a combination
of crude oil and not refined product postings is
preferable.
I. MULTIYEAR CONTRACTS
A multiyear contract is an agreement for a base year
with requirements extending for up to a maximum of four
additional years. A multiyear petroleum contract means the
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terms and conditions remain the same for succeeding
years. Only the price and quantity are renegotiated.
/"87_7 The advantage of this is that the contractor does
not have to review every clause again to determine his com-
pliance. He already knows. This is not insignificant
considering the many pages of "boilerplate."
Another advantage of multiyear contracting is that it
enables a company to plan its supply picture in the long
term. This is subject to the availability of crude oil.
But what is the long term? To some contractors it means
three to six years in the future. To others it means any-
thing beyond six months
,
Contractors who plan beyond one year can benefit from
this customer stability. Supplier stability is invaluable
to DOD in terms of readiness a A precedent for the success
of multiyear contracting was the Caltex Evergreen contract
for bulk fuel during the Vietnam war. The relationship
was established and the mechanics of supply were reliable.
Of course Caltex had the necessary fuel and wanted to sell
it. This may not hold true under present market conditions.
There is no guarantee that there is a cost savings from
the multiyear procedure. Some contractors interviewed see
no benefit to the arrangement. It means they are still
required to negotiate price, quantity, and submit supporting
documentation. Furthermore, the Government can still
cancel the contract for convenience.
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Contractors who do not plan "beyond six months have no
incentive for a multiyear obligation. Crude supplies may
not be known beyond this period for instance. Thus,
flexibility is needed.
Most contractors agree that multiyear contracts have
potential. A modification in the mechanics was suggested
to improve it. The desired arrangement is that the terms
and conditions remain the same. Additionally, the initial
price base line (reference point) should remain intact and
the economic price adjustment clause should stand alone
.
Thus, a new base line is not renegotiated and documented
each year. The quantity would be the only issue in question.
DOD is concerned with the competitive process and not
eliminating smaller companies from the process , Also, the
continued use of a price escalation clause is subject to the
same deficiency as in a single year contract. The contracting
officer loses some control over the contract price. This is
counterbalanced, somewhat, by the termination clause.
Multiyear agreements lessen the DOD administrative load.
Reduced solicitation packages are sent to signatories.
Negotiations are simplified. And a portion of supply needs





The future of the domestic refining industry is uncer-
tain. The GAO conducted a study in 1979, "The United States
Refining Policy In a Changing World Oil Environment .
"
/~77<i_7 I"t concluded:
Growing U.S. demand for refined products, considered
in light of already idle excess refining capacity in the
rest of the free world, uncertain supplies of crude
oil, a rapidly diminishing sweet crude resource base,
and downstream expansion plans of oil-producing nations
raises serious questions about the future of the U.S.
domestic refining industry.
Oil companies indicated a growing amount of excess capacity.
This was the reason one company sought the Government JP-4
business. The extra business kept their refinery near
full capacity.
Foreign refiners have the largest excess capacity. Almost
one-third of the Caribbean and European refining capacity
much of it owned by U.S. companies, lies idle. Therefore,
reliance on products refined in those centers may be con-
strued as an alternative to large capital outlays to add
domestic capacity. /~77:i_7
Limitations on both domestic and foreign reserves of
sweet crudes mean refiners are increasingly being forced to
process sour crudes. Processing sour crudes incurs invest-
ment and operating costs of up to $2 per barrel more than
with sweet crudes. /~77*. 9__7
Termination of domestic crude oil price controls is
predicted by GAO to have a significant impact. It will
eliminate most of the protection from foreign competition
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now enjoyed by U.S. refiners. In particular, it will affect
(1) small refineries and (2) competition at the refinery
level in the domestic market. £~77-ivJ/
A different aspect of refining capacity is the alloca-
tion of products. Since JP-4 and unleaded gasoline are
direct competitors, a refinery must give priority to one
of them when it is at near capacity. The stockholder view-
point is to refine the unleaded gasoline because of the
higher profit margins.
A December 1979 meeting was conducted by the Secretary
of Defense for the representatives of 12 oil companies.
General Seamon testified that the representative of the oil
companies were told: /~~72 : 7
J
Dependent upon their refinery capacity, both here
and overseas for the international companies, the
Department of Defense should be considered first,
and get x percentage of their production capacity
up front. That was may proposal to them.
While it is impossible to assess the full impact of that
proposal, it appears that suppliers may have decided it is
more advantageous to cooperate with the DOD on a voluntary
basis. ^72 :7_7
K. NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVES
The Naval Petroleum Reserves (NPR) were established
between 1912 and 1924. The original purpose of the petroleum
reserves was that oil should be conserved in the ground until
actually needed for national defense purposes.
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The hysteria which followed OPEC I led to abandonment
of the conservation philosophy. The Naval Petroleum Reserves
Production Act of 1976 authorized production of the reserves
for a six year period. Sale of the produced oil is to the
highest bidder. The 1976 legislation was a response to the
belief that these special reserves should now be produced
fully and used to meet the total needs of the Nation. This
meant they would no longer be reserved exclusively for the
Armed Services. Another factor cited in support of that
production was an effort to reduce the U.S. balance of
payments deficit. This deficit resulted from the purchase
of petroleum products from abroad. /~72:12_7
The sale of NPR production in January 1980 caused several
problems. A bid for 10,000 barrels at slightly more than
$41 per barrel established Elk Hills crude as the highest
priced domestic oil. That price produced a ripple effect
in the domestic market which caused prices of decontrolled
domestic crude to move to the same level. The increased price
also had international repercussions. Mexico raised the
price of its oil, Canada raised its natural gas price, and Saudi
Arabia protested. The U.S. had been encouraging Saudi Arabia
to hold down the price of its crude to $26 a barrel while
our Government was selling its oil at a much higher price
„
/~72:14J7
The Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee concluded that sale of the NPR production
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should be discontinued. It should be preserved, either in
the ground or in strategic storage. /""72:14_7 Presently,
the crude is still being sold on the open market,
L. STORAGE FACILITIES
Recent procurement shortages and the decision to draw
down DOD's war reserve stocks to permit routine peacetime
operations contributed to the 1979 deficits. However,
those stocks generally were far below the war reserve require-
ments even before 1979. The principal reason for those
deficiencies has been the lack of adequate storage facilities
at most U.S. military bases, /~72:1Q_7
Budgeting problems have caused this lack of adequate
storage. When Services have requested funds for these pro-
jects, they were typically reduced by significant amounts.
Consequently, these projects are no longer listed as a high
priority item. /~72:10-11_7 Hence, the problem is perpetuated,
M. DISTRIBUTION
A bulk petroleum contract is essentially an indefinite
quantity agreement. The contract provides the authority,
The customer then orders the product when he needs it.
The minimum quantity clause of the contract obligates
the Government to accept at least 25 percent of the contracted
dollar amount. This is a recent change. The previous
minimum lift requirement was $100 worth of fuel. Contractors





This is a difficult area for DFSC to manage. Require-
ments and contracts are predicated upon known requirements.
However, there are many unknowns in providing for the national
defense. For example, "base closures alter petroleum needs.
This political hot potato could take any number of directions.
Contractors position products and schedule refining based
upon the DFSC distribution plan (DP) and the distribution
plan authorization (DPA). /T&5_7 When the requirement
disappears, it can cause contractors extra planning and, in
some cases, money.
Another unknown is unit deployments. Hostilities
and potential trouble spots can relocate the forces requiring
fuel. The challenge is to rearrange distribution plans to
maintain readiness. This type scenario causes contractors
the same type of planning disruption.
These two examples are why the Government requires
the unilateral right to terminate a contract fcr convenience.
Providing for national defense is in everyone's best interest.
Furthermore, it is not reasonable to expect the taxpayer to
pay for services not received.
2. Number of Delivery Points
Contractor management of DOD distribution is signi-
ficantly different from commercial counterparts. According
to industry officials, commercial customers normally require
fewer shipments of larger quantities than the DOD, DFSC
contracts require more contractor management due to the
numerous small shipments. ^13

There are various channels of distribution for
petroleum products from the refiner from the customer:
C"5« 1*1J
Residual fuel oil, for example, may go to large industrial
and utility customers directly from the refiner or
through a few terminal operators and large dealers
equipped to handle the product. Petrochemical feedstocks
and commercial jet fuel are generally sold through
contracts "between the refiners and their customers.
The decision by a refiner as to whether he will
utilize the jobber channel is a matter of economics. It is
the usual choice to distribute through local jobbers where
the station density and the average throughput volumes are
low. /"ll:433_7
One strategy used by industry is to bid FOB origin
on all offers. This eliminates the hassle of complying
with the minutiae in the contract. Then, if DFSC wants
delivery, it contacts the commercial distribution side of
the company.
The DFSC has decentralized distribution responsi-
bility to the Defense Fuel Supply Regions. This has helped
the management, but DOD is a large organization, Z~8l_7
3 . Quality/Timeliness
DOD must manage the contract following award.
Two problems which develop periodically are fuel which is
not in accordance with the specification and late deliveries.
To combat the first problem, fuel is inspected at the
refinery prior to acceptance. Product not meeting the quality
requirement is refused. Occasionally the contractor will
114

ask for a waiver. If approved, DFSC is compensated with a
price discount or rebate due to lesser quality. ^~"8l_7
Late deliveries are handled through distribution management
channels and are also at reduced prices.
N. DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
The invocation of the Defense Production Act during
the OPEC I embargo demonstrated the inadequacy of the
procedure. The problem with the Act is that it took
several months to implement it. There are no known major
changes contemplated at this time, DOD may preposition
some administrative items to enable quicker implementation.
Contractors don't like mandatory compliance. They
commented that it is better to support the DOD under friendly
conditions.
0. PETROLEUM - A UNIQUE COMMODITY
There is logical evidence which supports the claim that
petroleum is unique--refer to Chapter III. But a basic
question remains unanswered, "Is petroleum so unique that it
requires different procedures?" Obviously, industry wants
the DFSC procedures to more closely resemble commercial
practices.
There are arguments which support keeping petroleum
procurement under the DAR. The Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) is in the commodity business. It buys foods, grains and
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feeds, fibers and textiles, wood, coal, and petroleum for
instance. Contractors in each area claim that their product
is unique and needs to be handled differently. /~~83_7
Only two items which DOD contracts for are not covered
by the DAR. Transportation services are exempted /~~DAR:1-102_7
and automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) is centrally
procured by the General Services Administration (GSA).
Transportation services have been highly regulated, although
this area is presently being deregulated. Consequently,
no goods or services that the DOD buys are exempt from the
DAR or a reasonable equivalent.
The approach taken by DLA has been to obtain deviations
to the DAR where they are appropriate. Deviations which
affect only one contract can be granted by the head of
certain major agencies. /"DAR : 1-109. 2_7 Blanket deviations
(affecting two or more contracts) must be approved by the DAR
Council. /~DAR: 1-109. 3_7 These deviations then become a
written part of the DAR. This approach is applied to all the
commodities, but petroleum in particular. /"~83_7
P. SUMMARY
Shortfalls in the procurement of bulk petroleum as a
result of OPEC I and OPEC II have caused concern among
legislators. This has generated studies by DFSC, a contract
review task force within DOD, and hearings by the Investigations
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The




Issues raised "by the petroleum industry are many and
varied. Suggested areas for improvement are Government
response time, the size and complexity of contract documents,
slow payments, lift requirements, socio-economic clauses,
the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR)
,
general differences
between Government and commercial contracts, Cost Accounting
Standards (CAS), cost and pricing data requirements, price
escalation, contract periods, and the Defense Production
Act.
DOD has already taken numerous actions to more closely
resemble commercial practices. Approximately two-thirds of
the clauses from contracts used in the foreign market, and
about one-half of the clauses from its domestic contracts
have been eliminated. Contractors acknowledge this is a step
in the right direction. However, they say much more is needed.
Other issues which affect the process are distribution,
storage facilities, refining capacity, profit margins on
JP-4, and the use of the Naval Petroleum Reserve.
The first step in problem solving is to identify the
problem. That is the purpose of this chapter. From this,
alternatives can be identified and evaluated.
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VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ISSUES
This chapter proposes possible alternatives to the
issues already addressed. Alternatives which are plausible,
but not politically feasible are also examined. The format
is to develop the possible alternative , This is followed
by an analysis of the alternative's merits and disadvantages.
Finally, an assessment of possible future implementation is
offered. These alternatives are not rank ordered by importance
and are not all inclusive
.
Alternatives are viable only if they can improve the
acquisition process. Improvements may be in the form of
dollar savings, time reductions, reduced administrative
requirements, or elimination of procurement shortfalls,
A. ALTERNATIVES TO JP-4
Substitute fuels for JP-4 are available. JP-5 and JP-8
are candidates to perform the same function as JP-4. This
could offer significant flexibility to DOD if these alterna-
tives are viable.
JP-4 is a naptha base jet fuel. It is used primarily
by the U.S. Air Force, although not exclusively. It is
considered to be a low quality jet fuel and is hazardous
due to its flash point of below room temperature. Yet it
represents over 50 percent of the DOD total fuel volume
„
In the Western Region of the U.S., JP-4 accounted for 63 per-
cent of the fiscal year 1979 total volume. Z~8l_7
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An alternative currently in use is JP-5. This is a
kerosene base jet fuel and is roughly equivalent to the
commercial jet fuel known as Jet A-l, JP-5 is used primarily
by the U.S. Navy. It is safer for on-board carrier operations
due to its higher flash point of 60 degrees Centigrade.
/"~MIL-T-5624K_7 It is also a better quality jet fuel than
JP-4 and correspondingly more expensive. /~~8l_7
A second alternative being suggested is JP-8. This is
a potential universal military jet fuel because it can fulfill
the needs of all the Services. /~8l_7 JP-8 is also a
kerosene base jet fuel.
Kerosene base jet fuels appear to offer significant
advantages over JP-4. They are better quality fuels. Safety
in handling is also increased. Furthermore, they are generally
similar to commercial aviation products.
There are significant disadvantages of kerosene jet
fuels, such as JP-5 and JP-8, which cannot be ignored. First,
they are more expensive than JP-4. It is possible that con-
version to a universal jet fuel would offset increased per
unit costs through storage savings. However, the production
capacity from a barrel of crude oil makes this impractical.
Kerosene base jet fuels (Jet A-l, JP-5> and JP-8) are drawn
from less than 15 percent of a barrel of crude. Comparatively,
JP-4 can be drawn from up to 40 percent of a barrel of crude
oil. /f"33:^_7 Therefore, much greater volumes of JP-4 are
possible from a quantity of crude oil.
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Industry officials advise that refineries cannot support
a universal military jet fuel. Industry capacity is insuf-
ficient to refine all Jet A-l or all JP-5, or all JP-8.
B. INCREASE FUEL INVENTORIES
Increasing fuel inventories can improve DOD's negotiating
position with the petroleum industry According to Commander
Marshall Sneiderman of the Naval Postgraduate School, petro-
leum supply can be thought of as one continuous pipeline. Crude
oil goes in one end and products come out the other end to
the consumer. Refiners, distributors, and DFSC are in that
pipeline. Generally, crude oil goes in the pipeline at a
steady rate and products are consumed at a relatively constant
rate. Large manipulative inventory stocks are not available
to the industry suppliers. The more fuel DFSC has in its
inventory, the more flexibility it has in purchasing.
Larger inventories enable more variance in the timing
of a purchase. This can result in dollar savings in the
short run. Especially when prices are spiraling upward
in a short period, this savings can be significant. An
example of this type of situation is OPEC II. Over the long
run, however, this advantage is diminished,, When prices continually
increase, the DOD must eventually buy regardless of price.
There are two ways the DOD can increase its fuel inven-
tories. Inventories are viewed in terms of the number of
days of supply. Perhaps the more obvious method of increasing
inventories is to add additional tankage and fill it.
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Funding for construction of new petroleum storage
facilities requires Congressional approval. New construction
must be authorized and then funded under the Military
Construct icn appropriation. It cannot come from operating
funds. The prospect of new storage is a costly alternative
as indicated by a House Subcommittee: £"72:11_7
Again, cost becomes a factor in deciding whether to
build hardened storage facilities. While the open tanks
are the cheapest form of construction, their vulnerability
appears to make further use of them unwise. Accordingly,
all new construction of storage facilities, worldwide
should be conducted with an eye toward the vulnerability
of the facilities in a wartime environment.
It is not clear whether additional storage is cost effec-
tive. However, it does improve defense readiness during
supply disruptions.
The second means of enlarging the number of days of
supply is through conservation. Reduced consumption by DOD
enables more use from a fixed inventory level. Conservation
was a contributing factor to enable DOD to increase its
fuel inventories in early 1980. Z~~72:7_7
The international petroleum market has not demonstrated
the effectiveness of increased inventories. In Business Week,
it was noted that spot prices are on the rise again and have
passed the $4-0 a barrel mark, "Spot prices are climbing
because consumers are afraid to use their reserves. You
can't use stocks if you don't think you can get them replen-
ished. The Western governments are finding the weapon they've
built can't be used." CZ5*5^J This situation is repre-
sentative of the long range dilemma of the buyer.
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There are tradeoffs to larger fuel inventories which
must be considered. First, the storage life of the fuel
must be considered. Fuel is subject to deterioration.
Consequently, there is an upper limit on how much fuel can
reasonably be stored. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
is the increased carrying costs. Carrying costs increase
proportionally with the size of the inventory. Just as
there is an optimum point in the Economic Order Quantity
(EOQ) model, so is there in the option of increased inven-
tories. At some point, the cost savings from selective
purchasing will be exceeded by larger carrying costs.
An increase of fuel inventories has Congressional favor.
In the Investigations Subcommittee report, the need for
additional fuel storage was emphasized. £~72:11_7
C. USE OF THE NAVAL PETROLEUM RESERVE (NPR)
1. Preservation of the NPR Crude Oil
The Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee recommended preservation of the NPR crude
oil, either in the ground or in strategic storage— see
Chapter V. This is justified on the grounds that "it will
probably be several years before the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR) ever contains enough oil to sustain the Nation
for more than a few days." /~72:14J7 The NPR is viewed as
the only reliable source of emergency national defense oil.
Retention of the NPR crude by either means achieves
the objective of future availability. But it seems clear
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that storage in the SPR is superior to leaving the oil in
the ground. The critical difference "between natural crude
oil deposits such as the NPR and crude oil held in storage
facilities like the SPR is the rate of extraction. Oil in
storage facilities can "be pumped out much faster than oil
in natural formations
. Z~71:2_7 This is an enormous
advantage for the SPR during hostilities. It should "be
noted that the SPR reservoirs are presently being filled at
the rate of about 100,000 barrels a day. The Senate voted
overwhelmingly to sharply accelerate filling of the SPR to
300,000 barrels a day. However, the legislation isn't likely
to make it through the House this year according to the Wall
Street Journal. £~^5_J
The SPR consists of not only crude oil but also
refined petroleum products which are placed in storage
facilities for rapid removal. These facilities may be above-
ground steel tanks, underground cavities created in salt
domes, or mined caverns in suitable rock formations. These
installations are fitted with pumps, pipelines, and tanker
loading facilities to enable filling, extraction, and trans-
port to refineries or distribution points. The fuel is then
delivered where it is needed. /~71* 1_7
2. Refine the NPR Crude for POD Use
Another alternative is to convert the NPR crude to
refined products. Then it can be put into strategic storage.
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The merits of this approach are supported by Gramm
and Maurice. /~17:71-73_7 Their hypothesis is that crude
oil stockpiling is a prime example of poor economics. They
examined the practice of long-term crude stockpiling in the
NPR. Considering only pertinent economic factors (interest
rates, royalties, inflation, and others), the authors
concluded that their calculations prove that it is a bad
investment to stockpile crude. "In fact, not only have the
reserves proven to be a poor economic investment, but the
U.S. public is likely losing money for every day the NPR's
are not produced." £~±7'.7~Lj
The Investigations Subcommittee counters the economic
argument with other considerations. The following comments
are from its report: /~72:12-13_7
Certainly, sales of NPR production have been beneficial
to the Treasury, and have permitted some reduction in
our balance of payments deficit. On the other hand, they
have also had a deterimental impact on the readiness of
our Armed Forces. . . . If the day should come when we
are involved in a conflict and our Armed Forces lack
the petroleum needed to pursue that conflict, the dollars
realized from those sales won't be able to propel the
aircraft, ships, tanks, and armored personnel carriers
which must prosecute such a war. This subcommittee
believes that as a Nation we have no other acceptable course
but to return to conservation of these reserves.
Other factors support a return to conservation as
well— see the above section on increasing fuel inventories.
Refined products have limited storage life due to deteriora-
tion. Additionally, refined fuels require storage tanks
which may cost more money.
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D. DOD ENTRY INTO THE CRUDE MARKET
The DOD has the option to obtain crude oil and have it
refined. This crude oil could come from the NPR or the
market place. The key motivation of this alternative is
the Government ownership of the NPR. Another contributing
factor is that excess refining capacity is on the rise— see
Chapter V.
There are important considerations which weigh against
this alternative. Currently, the NPR crude is still being
sold on the open market. /~87_7 Consequently, DOD has
no crude oil source it can use for this purpose. If DOD
wants to pursue this option under existing conditions, it
must purchase oil at a comparable price to the oil companies.
There is a limitation here. As one DOD official pointed out,
when products are tight, so are crude supplies.
A further consideration is who will refine the crude
oil once obtained. Interviews with spokesmen from the
larger oil companies indicated they are not interested in the
business. They already have enough crude supplies and cus-
tomers to keep their refineries near full capacity, It was
suggested that small refiners would probably be interested.
Assuming that DOD can find interested refiners, there still
remains another obstacle.
A contractual arrangement for refining crude oil and
returning fuel in kind could be very complex. It must be
remembered that each barrel of crude oil yields a variety
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of products. DOD is not interested in purchasing all of
these derivatives. Also, the proportions in which they are
produced rarely meets the needs of the customer. Consequently,
the contract would have to be for a percentage of JP-4, for
example. Costs would oe for the refining itself and the refiner's
trouble for disposing of the other products in accordance with
the "balanced "barrel concept. More risk is assumed "by DOD,
too, since it would own the crude oil refined. Under the
present system, fuel which is "off-specification" can simply
be refused and the refiner must correct it.
There is a lack of consensus within the Government con-
cerning the NPR crude oil and the refining issue. A DOD
official commented that DOE wants the oil to go into the SPR.
Alternatively, DOD desires that it be refined for its use.
E. DOD NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
The DFSC must appraise its own strengths and weaknesses
accurately as the Government representative in relation to
the petroleum industry's strengths and weaknesses. Only
as a result of an accurate appraisal of relative bargaining
strength can the DFSC contracting officers skillfully demand
the right things at the right time and make timely concessions.
/~4:149_7
1. Government as a Buyer
Government contracting is not synonymous with con-
tracting in the petroleum industry. Chapter V addresses
the differences between the two contracting worlds. It is
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evident that the Government is not a commercial buyer in the
commercial marketplace. Rather, it is the Government as a
buyer in the commercial marketplace. /~87_7 Ideally, the
DAR should approximate industry practice as much as possible.
Yet, it will continue to be different due to the public
funds involved.
Complaints about Government contracting are not unique
to the petroleum industry. /~78:87_7 Where industry
practices are unusual, the DAR must be made to accomodate
these procedures when permitted by legislation.
2. Industry Pricing; Practices
The petroleum refining and distribution industries
are oligopolies. As such, they face a kinked demand curve
in the short run. This enables price competition by DFSC.
Vertical integration lessens the effectiveness of buyer
efforts to increase competition, but it does not eliminate it.
In fact, industry concentration ratios are decreasing which
is in the Government's favor.
An understanding of the theory of variable-margin
pricing is essential if buyers are to obtain the right
price. Variable-margin is another name for balanced-barrel
pricing. In some cases, using average profit margins results in
prices that are too high Invariably when average margins
are used, prices considerably above fair prices result for
large long-term purchases such as annual contracts. /"4:9^_7
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3. Use of the Spot Market
Purchases of fuel on the spot market is a means of
promoting price competition. Currently, the spot market
can only "be used to cover procurement shortfalls. Z~84_7
To maintain leverage within the domestic markets, the spot
market could "be used for a percentage of purchases when spot
market prices are advantageous to D.FSC. Admittedly, this cuts
right across the current solicitation, negotiation, and
award procedure. But it is an accepted commercial practice
and would enable DFSC to promote price competition. ^T"33:5_7
4. Seller's Market
The petroleum products market is a seller's market
and will remain so in the forseeable future. This gives oil
companies a lot of power. Even though the DOD is the industry's
largest customer, this is offset due to the award breakout
among companies.
5. Patriotism
The Government must appeal to the national interests
of the companies. This sounds like an out-of-date cliche,
but almost everyone interviewed indicated this was a factor
in supporting the Government. Industry representatives
acknowledge that their responsibility is to the stockholders,
but not to the exclusion of the Nation's welfare,
P. MULTIYEAR CONTRACTING
Advantages of multiyear contracting--refer to Chapter V
—
make it an attractive alternative. It would further competi-
tion. In order for this to have greater impact, the price
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renegotiation aspect needs to be modified. Cost savings
could be recouped by the Government.
A method for its use is to contract a percentage of
requirements via the multiyear vehicle. Contracts could be
from two to five years in duration. The balance would be
contracted on an annual or spot purchase basis. This still
provides smaller companies an opportunity to receive Govern-
ment contract dollars. Z~"33 :2_7
The future for multiyear looks bright . Recent solicita-
tions from DFSC offered this to contractors as a bid option.
/~86_7 A few companies indicated a preference to bid in
this manner.
G. BLANKET MARKET PRICE EXEMPTIONS
A blanket exemption from submission of cost or pricing
data and CAS is possible. All petroleum contractors have been
able to justify the market price exemption. Petroleum
products will continue to be sold in substantial quantities
to the general public.
Removal of these requirements would reduce the contract
size. The contract could substitute a clause requiring
mandatory submission of data supporting the market price.
The Government can still protect itself through audit of
the data.
The major obstacle to this alternative is the law. Both
requirements were generated by legislation. It is doubtful
that Congress will change the law for one industry. This is
a requirement that is here to stay.
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H. CONTRACT QUANTITY VARIANCE
Instead of stating requirements in terms of a minimum
lift quantity, the contracted amount could allow a variance.
A variance allows a high/low range in which the orders can
fluctuate
. /~85_7
A contract quantity with a plus or minus variance allows
latitude in "both directions. It is a "bilateral approach
which allows "both parties a hedge. This may result in a
higher minimum quantity for the Government.
If circumstances prevent the Government from ordering
the minimum tender, the contract can still be terminated
for convenience. Therefore, DOD still has recourse
for exigencies. It also offers DOD the opportunity for more
fuel without additional negotiation.
I. OPEN SOLICITATIONS
Open solicitations have been used by DFSC during periods
of procurement shortages. An open solicitation means there
is not a closing date for submission of proposals. It is not
presently in use, but it is a tool with potential. Its intent
was to ease the deadline for submitting proposals. Offers
may extend into the contract performance period. Z~86_7
An advantage of this technique is that contractors with
uncertain crude supplies may bid at a later date. Flexibility
for the contractors is increased. Firms can submit a proposal
anytime they want to sell fuel. This could be due to firms'
desires to rotate fuel stocks or by the presence of additional
fuel due to schedule changes.
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Open solicitatins are not without their problems. With-
out a closing date, DFSC may not know if their require-
ments are going to be fulfilled until well into the contract
period. It is also difficult to compare offers. The method
previously used to evaluate proposals was to accept offers
negotiated within the competitive range. /~86_y7
An alternative method is to set a price ceiling and allow
the contracting officer to accept offers negotiated within
that ceiling. Offers outside the ceiling would be elevated
to the head of the procuring agency for action.
J. UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS
Unsolicited proposals offer contractors the added flex-
ibility to seek Government business. This has a similar
effect as a proposal received uner an open solicitation.
An unsolicited proposal can be submitted without being
in strict compliance with Government requirements. This does
not mean the contractor is in noncompliance, but that follow-
up paperwork can be accepted by the contracting officer within
a specified time period. The major advantage of this is the
additional time in which to generate the supporting documentation.
This has a chance for a greater usage in the future. The
DFSC has received some unsolicited proposals from contractors.




K. CENTRALIZED PURCHASING vs. DECENTRALIZED PURCHASING
Centralization of the purchasing function is a suggested
means of attaining "both optimum operating efficiency and
maximum benefit. This is the concept presently in use within
DOD. The alternative is to extend it even further.
Centralization offers many "benefits. Duplication of
effort can "be reduced. Quantity discounts are also possible
due to larger solicitations. Centralization provides an
opportunity for specialization among purchasing agents.
Zf^398_7
The Commission on Government Procurement recognized the
potential of centralization. In its final report, it recom-
mended the adoption of "cross-servicing." /~76:iii_7
Cross-servicing is the interagency use of field personnel
at contractor locations to perform such activities as preaward
surveys, price analysis, and quality assurance. Cross-
servicing is uncommon in the Federal Government because it
is voluntary,, There is no one in the executive branch who
controls it. /~76:22_J7
Cross-servicing has encountered resistance within the
Government. The GAO points out that there is no tradition
for this in civilian agencies. Coupled with this is a
general lack of knowledge about the concept, //f~76:24j7
Thus, it is not surprising that this is resisted. Agencies




Typical benefits of cross-servicing could disappear if
purchasing authority for other agencies is consolidated
under DFSC. It seems reasonable that large volumes could
be added with success. The tradeoff becomes a span of control
which is unwieldy. The farther removed a customer is from
the procurement source, the harder it becomes to correct
problems. DFSC already purchases for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) It could perform this same
function for other agencies.
Decentralization means to move the procurement function
closer to the user. Advantages are quicker response time,
closer proximity to the supplier, and better control by user
organizations. Despite these advantages, movement in this
direction appears to have little to offer D0D a Decentrali-
zation would require contractors to respond to even more
solicitations and contract documents. This would seem to
be counterproductive, realizing that contractors complain
about this volume already. Plus, decentralization requires
even more highly trained contracting officers that under-
stand petroleum contracting. Advantages of centralization
become disadvantages of decentralization.
L. EXEMPT PETROLEUM PROCUREMENT FROM THE DAR
The use of a DOD panel to oversee petroleum procurement
is an alternative to the DAR. Several circumstances support
a more specialized management of the procurement. Fuel
purchases are becoming a dominant portion of the DLA budget.
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An unofficial estimate of the 1980 percentage is upwards of
two-thirds of the total. A continuation of this upward
trend is expected to continue.
The DAR already has numerous exemptions for petroleum
included in it. At some point, it becomes more practical
to separate coverage of an item than to exempt it clause by
clause
Even though this suggestion has some appeal, it is not
practical. Despite many exemptions, the majority of the DAR
applies to petroleum procurement. Legislative mandates limit
the amount of change which can be made in the process.
M. SUMMARY
There are many ways to deal with the problems and issues
which have been identified in connection with petroleum
procurement. Some are politically feasible and others are not<
Requirements derived from legislative mandate are probably
going to remain intact. The Legislature has deemed these
procedures to be in the public's best interest „ The DAR
represents an amalgamation of laws and administrative
directives. Despite problems, it works. Socio-economic
clauses represent good intentions and are politically
desirable. Submission of data to justify exemption from cost
or pricing data and CAS is by public law and continues on a
case-by-case basis.
Substitute fuels for JP-4 are available. They are JP-5
and JP-8. However, industry does not have the capacity to
produce them in necessary volumes for complete substitution.
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Many options offer realistic alternatives to improve
the procurement position of DOD
. Increasing fuel inventories
enables short-term flexibility in buying low cost fuel.
Ongoing conservation and the addition of storage facilities
contribute to this strength.
The NPR is a multipurpose source of crude oil. Sale
of the crude should be ceased and the oil diverted to DOD.
This can be sent to the SPR or converted to refined products.
A similar plan is for DOD to purchase crude oil on the spot
market and contract fit it to be refined
.
DOD must continue to assess its strengths and exploit
these. DOD is the largest customer in the market . Through
price competition, it can improve its position. This can be
achieved through analysis of variable-margin pricing and
purchases on the spot market. Patriotism should not be
overlooked since a free America permits the free enterprise
system.
Multiyear contracting should be given another look.
It could be modified to renegotiate quantities only. Open
solicitations offer a technique for periods of fuel shortage
or crude supply uncertainty. Unsolicited proposals are a
worthwhile means for contractors to sell fuel without time
constraints on data submission.
The DFSC is a centralized procurement organization. It





There are many issues confronting the procurement of
bulk petroleum, but they are not insurmountable
. After
a review of historical developments and the resultant contract-
ing procedure, it appears that several significant points
emerge
.
Conclusions are presented first, followed by recommenda-
tions Q The main thoughts are rendered, along with references
to supporting arguments and documentation.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The Government's bulk petroleum contracting procedure
is moving toward the industry practice, but will never reach it .
The legislative and administrative constraints permeating the
process are put forward in Chapter II. Additionally, historical
precedents from Chapter IV highlight how many present require-
ments came into existence.
There are many issues which separate DOD from the
industry. These are detailed in Chapter V. Perhaps the
most significant disparity is the socio-economic goals imposed
upon the DOD acquisition process. Next would be the safe-
guards to protect the taxpayers* money.
2. DOD faces a seller's market for procurement of petro -
leum fuels and all the problems inherent therein . Despite
the fact that the market turns soft periodically, it will
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remain a sellers' market for a while. The industry is making
sufficient profits to remain healthy, as was pointed out in
Chapter V. The driving factor has been the OPEC embargoes
and declining U.S. production. More detail is offered in
Chapter IV.
3. Inadequate planning and management of the Naval Petro -
leum Reserve (NPR) and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)
have compounded POP's problems . Sale of the NPR crude has
depleted the Reserve with undesirable side effects as noted
in Chapter V. Also, U.S. interests can be further promoted
by filling of the SPR.
4. There are no substitutes for_mobility fuels and in
particular JP-4 . Fuel is a unique commodity. JP-4 dominates
the discussion because, as shown in Chapters III through VI,
there is no commercial equivalent. A lack of replacement fuels
which can be produced in sufficient quantities illustrate the
dilemma.
5. POP has not taken maximum advantage of its market
power as the petroleum industry's largest customer . The
petroleum industry has perceived POP as a spot market buyer
in the past. Chapters IV and VI mention product allocation
as a change to this procedure. Yet, available tools which
could be used to increase price competition are not exploited.
Examples proposed in the alternatives are increasing fuel
inventories, purchases of crude oil on the spot market and
increased use of multiyear contracts.
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6. Changes in the petroleum contracting procedures are
perceived as a step in the right direction, but of insuffi-
cient magnitude
.
Timeliness of contractual agreements,
faster payments, the contract length and complexity, and the
minimum lift quantity are a few of the issues raised. Much
of the present contract reduction is due to elimination of
duplicate requirements. /"Chapter V_J
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Sale of crude oil from the NPR should be stopped
„
Production should continue with a portion being stored in
the SPR as refined product and the remainder as crude oil .
As noted in Chapter VI, this is in line with the opinion
of the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee. A disparity in disposition of the crude exists
between DOE and DOD. The NPR is intended for defense pur-
poses, therefore the author supports the view of having a portion
refined for DOD use„ The suggestion that the remainder go to
the SPR as crude was noted in the alternatives discussion.
This is due to the limited storage life of refined product.
2. Fuel inventories should be increased t o the maximum
extent possible, consistent with tradeoff analysis on increased
carrying costs . As discussed in the alternatives, larger
inventories enable short-term flexibility. This can result
in dollar savings. Furthermore, it is consistent with the
posture of a strong national defense. Limitations on the
amount of increase are carrying costs and shelf life.
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3. Multiyear contracting should be modified so that
price escalation and the terms and conditions remairi un-
changed during the contract life. Only quantity should be
renegotiated annually
. This offers a significant reduction
in procurement administrative lead time as noted in Chapters
V and VI. Both contractors and the Government stand to "benefit
from the reduced workload. The contracting officer has less
control, but he is not without safeguards. The success of
multiyear contracting has a historical precedence.
4. A quantity variance in the contract should replace
the minimum lift requirement . This allows DOD the option
of a minimum amount plus the authorization for some additional
fuel without renegotiation. The Government can always
terminate a contract as a sovereign when necessary.
5. Petroleum procurement should be exempted from all
nonlegislated requirements. _ DFSC should be as near the
industry practice of conducting business as the law permits .
Fuel is becoming such a large portion of the DOD operating
budget that every effort should be made to streamline the
procurement process. The discussion in Chapters III through
VI support the notion that unnecessary work results in
higher costs to the consumer. One suggested method for
management is to form a DOD panel to oversee all aspects of
the procurement process external to the DAR. Legislative
requirements would remain intact.
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6. Requirements that are granted exemptions from the
PAR on a routine basis should W replaced with
.
a clause that
requires submission of the supporting;, data . It is a pure
nuisance to continually hold Cost Accounting Standards and
the submission of cost or pricing data over the petroleum
industry's head when it has demonstrated a track record of
justified exemptions. The discussion in Chapter V pointed
out the additional volume this requires.
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percentage of purchases should be allowed via the spot market
when prices are competitive
. As noted in Chapter IV, the
spot market is presently used to meet unfulfilled require-
ments. If this option is added up front, the contracting
officer has a tool to apply leverage during negotiations. The
percentage can remain small enough to not damage the procure-
ment process.
8. Further use of unsolicited proposals should be made
by contractors . The delayed timing is what makes this method
attractive. It offers contractors the chance for additional
business under the advantages mentioned in Chapter VI.
9. Further research should be conduc t ed in the area of
procurement practices by large private consumers of energy ,
10. Further research should be conducted concerning the
role of" transportation and distribution in the marketing of
fuel . Transportation limits the options of a contractor's
bid. Also, transportation is a significant portion of the
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